Varieties of Euroscepticism: The Case of the European Extreme Right

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Abstract

The European extreme right has been understood as a monolithic entity regarding its Euroscepticism. Contrary to this, it is demonstrated in this article that in fact the extreme right adopts varying positions on Europe. Theoretically, party positions on Europe are conceptualised as a three-fold dimension, namely positions on first the principle, second the practice, and third the future of EU cooperation. From this, three types of Euroscepticism are identified. First, the ‘rejecting’ type comprising parties against all abovementioned dimensions. Second, the ‘conditional’ type containing parties not against the principle of EU cooperation but against its practice and its future. Third, the ‘compromising’ type including parties accepting both the principle and the practice of EU cooperation but opposing further integration. In accounting for this diversity, the article concludes that first, the parties displaying strong authoritarian values reject Europe regardless of their economic policy. Second, the parties refraining from ‘rejecting’ Euroscepticism support centrist and capitalist economic policies displaying comparatively less authoritarian values.

The accelerated process of European integration has produced increased levels of opposition, which have been ever more prominent since the early 1990s. Opposition has taken various forms and at times halted or delayed attempts to enhance European political unity. This is why trying to understand contemporary European politics without understanding the process of opposition to integration is a futile exercise. To that purpose the study of negative party positions on European integration and the European Union (EU), henceforth Euroscepticism, has gained prevalence in academic research informing an expanding literature during the last decade. The literature has thus far explored the general phenomenon of Euroscepticism from a theoretical perspective (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2000, 2003; Taggart 1998), has provided interesting country cases (indicatively: Conti 2003; Harmsen & Spiering 2004a; Johansson & Raunio 2001; Kopecky & Mudde 2002; Lees 2002; Quaglia 2003; Sitter 2001; Taggart & Szczerbiak 2001) as well as European-wide comparative case studies (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2002, 2004). Moreover, academic interest has largely focused on different positions on European integration among party families, namely classifications of political parties with similar long-standing agendas (Hix 1999; Marks et al. 2006; Marks & Steenbergen 2004; Marks & Wilson 2000).

Despite the increasing scholarly attention given to the study of Euroscepticism, differences within party families have only recently been identified (Batory & Sitter 2004; Benedetto & Quaglia 2007) and have not yet been thoroughly explained. Seeking to go some way towards addressing this gap, this article focuses on the European extreme right as a prime example of a party family within which individual party response to European integration has been particularly dissimilar. There are two key research questions posed in this article.
These are: (1) “how do extreme right nationalist parties respond to European integration?” and (2) “how is the ideological identity of these parties connected to their position on Europe?” The phenomenon of Euroscepticism within the context of the extreme right party family is particularly interesting. This is because the extreme right has thus far been understood as a monolithic entity with regards to its position on European integration (Hix 1999: 78; Hooghe et al. 2004: 133), namely utterly opposing the project (Marks & Wilson 2000: 457). Contrary to this, it is demonstrated in this article that extreme right nationalist parties actually display different levels of Euroscepticism. This divergent stance is explained with reference to the parties’ ideological identity deriving from the literature on the two-dimensionality of European party systems (Kitschelt 1994; Hix 1999).

Theoretically, party positions on Europe are conceptualised as a three-fold dimension, namely positions on first the principle, second the practice, and third the future of EU cooperation/integration. From this, three types of Euroscepticism can be identified. These are: first, the ‘rejecting’ type comprising parties wholeheartedly against all aspects of European integration; second, the ‘conditional’ type containing parties not against the principle of EU cooperation but against its practice and its future; and third, the ‘compromising’ type including parties accepting both the principle and the practice of EU cooperation but oppose future integration. The findings of the comparative party manifesto research conducted in this article support the relevance of this typology. These three different positions on European integration are reflected across the makeup of the extreme right nationalist party family. In accounting for this diversity the article considers the literature on the two-dimensionality of European party systems, namely the authoritarian-libertarian and socialist-capitalist axes of political conflict. Using the data provided by the expert survey of Benoit and Laver (2006), the article positions the parties on the two axes mentioned above and identifies patterns associated with different levels of Euroscepticism. The two main conclusions are firstly, that parties displaying strong authoritarian values reject Europe regardless of their economic policy and secondly, that parties which refrain from rejecting Europe support centrist or capitalist economic policies and mostly display less authoritarian values.

The first part of this article puts forward a typology of party-based Euroscepticism, from which, drawing evidence from party manifesto research, European extreme right parties are categorised. The second part discusses the structure of European party systems and presents the derived hypotheses and the data. The third part maps the parties under investigation on the two dimensions of political conflict and discusses how the parties’ ideological profile relates to their position on Europe.

Varieties of Euroscepticism

The term Euroscepticism has been used contextually since roughly the mid 1980s and can be traced back to journalistic articles written for the British press (Harmsen & Spiering 2004b: 15). The term has progressively taken root elsewhere particularly since the debate in various European countries over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty during the early 1990s. As such, the term has assumed different meanings across time and space. For instance, in the mid-1980s Britain it was used interchangeably with the term “anti-Marketeer” (Spiering 2004: 128) whereas in France it has been used as a synonym of the word “souverainism”, namely preserving a state’s sovereignty (Harmsen & Spiering 2004b: 17). Harmsen and Spiering (2004b: 17) argue that “[the term] assumes a meaning which must be understood relative to the different national political traditions and experiences of European integration which frame those debates”.

There is a vagueness of the term Euroscepticism and this is partly reflected in the associated literature and the fact that scholars have not as yet identified a precise definition for the phenomenon of party-based opposition to Europe. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) have differentiated between “hard” and “soft” Euroscepticism. On the one hand, the term “Hard Euroscepticism” indicates a party’s “outright rejection of the
entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU” (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2001: 10). On the other hand, the authors refer to “Soft Euroscepticism” as qualified opposition or disagreement on one or more policy areas. However, although this definition dominates scholarly articles on Euroscepticism, it is relatively broad and over inclusive. In criticising this typology, Kopecky and Mudde (2002: 300) rightly claim that the demarcation line between “hard” and “soft” Euroscepticism is blurred and that “the criteria used to connect and separate the term remain unclear”. Indeed, there remains a lack of clarity about how many and which policies should a party oppose in order to still be characterised as “soft” Eurosceptic (as opposed to “hard” Eurosceptic). In other words, if a party opposes three or more EU policies, is its Euroscepticism still soft or has it crossed the boundaries and has become hard? Would this depend on the number of policies or their substance? Or somehow on both? Or is it solely the wish for withdrawal, which constitutes the boundary between “hard” and “soft” Euroscepticism? Furthermore, this typology mainly considers opposition to the current EU framework and seems to be overlooking issues of further integration, including the deepening and the widening of the EU.

Kopecky and Mudde (2002) have suggested an alternative categorisation of the term, in which they differentiate between diffuse and specific support for European integration, leading to four types of party positions on Europe. The authors define diffuse as “support for the general ideas of European integration” while specific is seen as “support for the general practice of European integration” (2002: 300-301). This framework leads to a two-by-two matrix of possible party positions on Europe structured along the Europhobe/Euroophile and EU-optimist/pessimist axes. These include: firstly, the “Euroenthusiasts” who support both the ideas of European integration and the general practice of integration; secondly, the “Eurorejects” who do not accept either; thirdly, the “Eurosceptics” who support the idea of a united Europe but disagree with the general practice of integration; and finally, the “Europragmatists” who are against the idea of the EU but support the practice of European integration (Kopecky & Mudde 2002). These categories being ideal types, they argue, are serviceable for the qualitative analysis of party positions.

This alternative conceptualisation has significantly moved the debate forward on the definition of Euroscepticism, despite the fact that parts of it seem to be counterintuitive. Although the categories “Euroenthusiasts” and “Eurorejects” are straightforward, conceptual problems arise within both “Europragmatists” and “Eurosceptics”. As far as the “Eurosceptics” are concerned, it seems theoretically possible to sustain that they support the idea of cooperation at the European level but not in the shape of the EU. For instance, the “Eurosceptics” could be in favour of a type of confederation at EU level. However, this analysis lacks precision because it suggests neither what type of EU level cooperation these parties wish for, nor which parts of the current integration process they oppose. What is more, regarding the “Europragmatists”, principled opposition to the idea of European integration is highly unlikely to include favourable positions on the project of the current EU. As a result, “Europragmatists” hardly exist in real life politics. This is also manifested in the authors’ analysis of Central and Eastern European political parties where they classify only two parties under this category; one of which is actually acknowledged by the authors to be between two types (Kopecky & Mudde 2002: 316). In sum, Taggart and Szczerbiak’s definition lacks the specific criteria of categorisation and overlooks issues of further integration. Kopecky and Mudde’s definition has similar shortcomings, as well as a counter-intuitive suggestion.

The criteria and the typology

Given the abovementioned shortcomings of the definitions of party-based Euroscepticism presented in the literature, this article seeks to fill this gap by putting forward a typology based on a three-dimensional conceptualisation of European integration. The three constituent parts of European integration suggested provide the criteria on the basis of
which the typology is constructed. The article puts forward this conceptualisation because arguably the reason why the current definitions of Euroscepticism lack precision and seem to be counter-intuitive is because scholars have so far failed to provide concrete indicators of what European integration is. As a means to address this lacuna, this article proposes to break down European integration into its three fundamental aspects. These are first the principle, second the practice, and third the future of European integration.

Conceptualising European integration as a three-fold dimension derives from an attentive reading of the Treaties establishing the European Union (TEU). First, the principle of European integration refers to the member states’ desire for cooperation at a European level. The preamble of the TEU states how the member states are “RESOLVED to mark a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities” (European Union 2002: 9). For the purposes of this article, the principle of European integration is conceptualised as the wish and willingness for any type of cooperation at a European level, not necessarily the one embodied by the EU. It thus refers to the principle of state cooperation at a higher multilateral level (not only bilateral such as in trade terms for instance) irrespective of the framework within which this occurs. Second, the practice of European integration includes the institutional balance within the EU, as well as the legal reality embodied by the acquis communautaire. In other words, the practice of EU cooperation includes the balance between the intergovernmental and the supranational governing of the EU and the policies that are accepted as being managed at the EU level. Indicatively, the TEU reads: “The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire” (European Union 2002: 11). Third, the future of integration lies in the member states’ legally confirmed willingness for ‘an ever closer union’. This indicates their wish to continue further cooperation transferring more policy competencies to the EU level. The TEU confirms this common willingness: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (European Union 2002: 10).

In sum, the principle refers to the wish and willingness for cooperation at a European multilateral level, the practice to the institutional and policy status quo of how the EU functions, and the future to the deepening of integration (also see Table 1).

Table 1: The conceptualisation of European integration/cooperation

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<tr>
<th>Three-dimensional conceptualisation of European integration/cooperation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Principle</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Practice</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Future</strong></td>
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This conceptualisation departs from the existing literature in that it breaks down European integration into a three-fold rather than a linear phenomenon. The models that sought to explain political conflict in the EU have depicted European integration as one-dimensional. These are the international relations model (Moravcsik 1998), the Hix-Lord model (1997), and the Hooghe-Marks model (2001). All these three models take a one-dimensional approach to integration. They conflate the principle, practice and future aspects of European integration within a single dimension that extends from less to more integration. However, a linear depiction of integration does not help attain analytical precision because integration is viewed only through one prism. Admittedly, the suggested three-

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1 The TEU is selected as the major document establishing the EU that all the current 27 member states abide by. It also clearly lays out the principles, the practice, and the future aspirations of the European project.
dimensional approach of the EU builds on the idea of diffuse and specific support for integration advanced by Kopecky and Mudde (2002) whereby the authors differentiate between the idea and the practice of European integration. Nevertheless, this analysis departs from Kopecky and Mudde’s because first, it offers a concrete explanation of what EU principle and practice are, based on the EU’s own legal documents. Second, it acknowledges the important dimension of the member states’ agreement on building an ever closer union thus referring to the future of integration.

This three-dimensional conceptualisation of integration provides the criteria according to which the typology of Euroscepticism has been constructed. These three aspects of integration represent the point of reference from which this article studies party-based Euroscepticism. Furthermore, this conceptualisation of integration deals with the shortcomings of the definitions presented in the literature, namely the lack of precision and the failure to incorporate issues of further integration into the typology. Firstly, it provides precisely defined indicators of what European integration is, in order to minimise potential analytical confusions. Secondly, it adds the criterion of future integration offering a more comprehensive view of European integration and thereby suggests that there are additional levels of integration that a party can be opposed to, without necessarily opposing the principle of European cooperation or the practice of the EU status quo. Finally, this conceptualisation also has the potential to reveal significant qualitative differences between parties that have otherwise been understood as similar in terms of their Euroscepticism; a clear example of which are the parties belonging to the European extreme right.

Based on the criteria of the principle, practice and future of integration, extreme right nationalist parties are expected to group under three types of party-based Euroscepticism. These are (also see Table 2):

1. **Rejecting Euroscepticism**: parties that are wholeheartedly against all aspects of European integration. They reject the principle of European cooperation, the practice of institutional and policy arrangements at EU level, and they do not foresee any value from future cooperation. Consequently, these parties support that all policies should be dealt with domestically. They advocate withdrawal from the EU employing a strong anti-supranationalism and national self-determination rhetoric. They are against the transfer of power and decision-making authority to the EU and aim to restore the sovereignty of the nation state’s institutions.

2. **Conditional Euroscepticism**: parties that acknowledge that the principle of cooperation in Europe at a multilateral level is to an extent beneficial to the nation state, but for them unification is detrimental to the interests and the sovereignty of their country. In their rhetoric, they demonstrate a conditional wish for cooperation indicating that national sovereignty must under no circumstances be compromised. They accept a confederal-type cooperation on particular policies where they think it is their national interest to do so. They dismiss the practice of integration and the institutional balance of powers, endorsing solely intergovernmental cooperation. They do not accept that any decisions should be taken by supranational bodies and advocate that the EU should be radically reformed in order to guarantee benefits to national interests. They reject any future cooperation at the EU level.

3. **Compromising Euroscepticism**: parties that are in favour of the principle of cooperation at the European level and most importantly accept the practice of the status quo. These parties have compromised their position to recognize that a degree of power transfer to supranational institutions, while not politically desirable, is necessary in order to achieve economic prosperity. They are in favour of integration particularly when it comes to economic polices and advocate that the EU should exist as it is but should also seek to guarantee benefits to national
interests through its institutions. These parties seek to strengthen their country’s position within the existing structure of the EU, which means that they are willing to play ‘by the rules of the game’. However, these parties do not go as far as to advocate ‘an ever closer union’, in other words future political integration.

Table 2: The typology of Euroscepticism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party positions on European integration</th>
<th>Rejecting</th>
<th>Conditional</th>
<th>Compromising</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principle of European integration/cooperation</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>In favour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice of European integration/cooperation</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>In favour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future of European integration/cooperation</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
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</table>

As an alternative to the principle, practice and future of integration, another typology based on the division between economics and politics at EU level could be theoretically possible. However, to ensure clarity of argument this division has not been employed for constructing the typology of Euroscepticism because the parties examined in this article adopt mainly a sovereignty-based rather than a policy-based rhetoric. Dividing integration into economics and politics is theoretically useful, yet the parties seem to be much more interested in debating the degree of sovereignty they are prepared to transfer to supranational institutions and the EU in general regardless of policy. Furthermore, extreme right parties are not explicit in their manifestos on what they think about economics and politics. On the contrary, they mostly treat the EU as a whole and do not single out particular EU policies unless they have a specific interest in them, such as for instance border control for the French Front National (FN). Moreover, while it is true that some parties are willing to cede a degree of sovereignty when it comes to regulating the economy at the EU level, such as the Italian Alleanza Nazionale (AN), most extreme right parties do not openly articulate their discourse in this manner. Furthermore, extreme right parties are not explicit in their manifestos on what they think about economics and politics. On the contrary, they mostly treat the EU as a whole and do not single out particular EU policies unless they have a specific interest in them, such as for instance border control for the French Front National (FN). Moreover, while it is true that some parties are willing to cede a degree of sovereignty when it comes to regulating the economy at the EU level, such as the Italian Alleanza Nazionale (AN), most extreme right parties do not openly articulate their discourse in this manner. Therefore, it is difficult to disentangle party positions on various EU policies using party manifestos as a primary source because most parties simply do not address the EU in these terms.

This three-fold typology does not put forward ‘ideal types’ in a Weberian sense. As such, it does not present analytical constructs to be used as yardsticks to determine the extent to which real empirical phenomena are similar to or differ from some predefined measure. Instead, the typology proposes “real types” not independent of the cases under investigation. That is to say, the findings of the comparative party manifesto research utilised within the context of this article provides evidence that supports the relevance of this typology.

Measuring Euroscepticism: drawing empirical evidence from the European extreme right nationalist parties

This part of the article conducts a medium-N analysis considering right-wing nationalist parties that have been elected to the European Parliament (EP) during the legislative period 2004-2009. Parties that have been elected to the EP have been selected for two reasons. First, it is recognised that since they have accepted to operate within a European institution, they should have formulated concrete positions on European issues and policies. Second, the extreme right nationalist parties elected to the EP have had reasonable electoral success both nationally and at the EU level. In this manner, parties of

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2 Party positions on economics and politics at EU level could be disentangled in a qualitative work that focuses on interviews of party officials.
very limited political strength are excluded. The sample consists of parties that have not allied with the mainstream centre-right orientated European People’s party. These parties either belong to the Union for a Europe of the Nations and the Independence/Democracy political groups, or are independent parties that have previously allied with the dissolved Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty EP political group. In order to substantiate that these parties display an extreme right nationalist ideology, the criterion that a party should score more than 15 on the general left-right dimension in Benoit and Laver’s expert survey (2006: 230) is used. A number of parties have been omitted because they are not included in the Benoit and Laver survey; the data of which are used in the third section of the article. As a result of the above criteria and restrictions, a total of 11 parties from seven EU member states are considered. These parties all reflect at least one of the three types of Euroscepticism put forward in this article (see Table 3 on p.11).

More precisely, the ‘rejecting’ type consists of parties that are against the principle of ceding national sovereignty to non-national institutions and utterly disapprove of developments such as the Lisbon Treaty or enhanced legislation at the EU level. They suggest that the EU has been one of the sources of their domestic immigration problems, that foreign policy should remain a strictly national concern, and that their national economic problems have been caused by European economic integration. All these parties do not accept the principle that nations should cooperate at a higher multilateral level, including the EU framework. Since these parties utterly oppose the principle of multilateral cooperation, they are also against the practice of EU as a project as well as future European integration.

An example of this ‘rejecting’ type party is the French party, Front National (FN), which supports the radical renegotiation of all the European Treaties, and in the case that the rest of the member states do not agree, the party would argue for the organisation of a referendum on the question “Should France regain its independence vis-à-vis the Europe of Brussels?” (Front National 2007a: 61). Indeed, the literature suggests that “the FN calls for a restoration of French sovereignty and independence and for the exit of France from the EU” quoting Le Pen as saying “Let’s liberate France” (Hainsworth et al. 2004: 47). The party argues that France needs to restore sovereignty in the currency, fiscal policy, immigration policy, border control, and the supremacy of national law over the European. Similarly, in the manifesto of the Belgian party, Vlaams Belang (VB), it is stated, “we adopt a restrained and critical attitude towards the European Union with its bureaucracy and tendency to meddle where the sovereignty of the people should prevail” (Vlaams Belang 2007). According to VB, the EU intrudes on the sovereignty of the nation state and its people, which is more important than anything else. Along the same lines, the Polish party, Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR), argues: “We oppose the incorporation of Poland into the European Union and we will strive so that Polish people reject integration within the European Union in the national referendum” (Liga Polskich Rodzin 2008). Moreover, Italian party, Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (MSFT) argues that “Italy and the European states should restore political sovereignty” (Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore 2007: 2). The manifesto of MSFT states: “We reject the European Union which was born in Maastricht and was artificially created from above and without the will of the people” (Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore 2007: 3). All of these parties clearly reject...
the *principle* that European member states should cooperate at a multilateral level and instead support principles of national self-determination.

The parties that adopt a ‘conditional’ stance on Europe refrain from maintaining the idea that their countries should withdraw from the EU, which is what strongly differentiates them from the ‘rejecting’ Eurosceptics. For these parties, the EU framework is clearly not the right platform for cooperation, although European cooperation in general is desirable. In contrast to the ‘rejecting’ type they crucially accept the *principle* that the European states need and should cooperate. Despite their complete disagreement with the *practice* of the EU framework and the *future* of European integration, they accept the *principle* of multilateral cooperation.

Examples of parties which maintain a ‘conditional’ stance are as follows. In the case of the Austrian party, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), the European Constitutional Treaty has been called “madness” (2007b) and Andreas Mölzer, the party’s only Member of the European Parliament, argues that the “Europe of the ‘Brussels syndicate’ has nothing in common with the conception of a Europe of free and sovereign states” (Mölzer 2007). On the other hand, the party’s official programme states that “The future of Europe lies in the close cooperation of its peoples […] The European Union is only one part of the European reality. It should not develop to a European federal state but to a confederation of states” (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 2007c). The FPÖ thus implicitly accepts the *principle* of cooperation, but rejects both the *practice* of the EU and the *future* deepening of integration. Similarly, the French Mouvement pour la France (MPF) openly supports a de Gaullist type of Europe whereby the party would “guarantee, preserve and reinstate the national independence in a Europe of the cooperation of the States and the peoples […] the Movement for France proposes a new Europe, a Europe of the nations and the peoples” (Mouvement pour la France 2007a).

Moreover, the Italian party, Lega Nord (LN), argues that “we must construct a Europe that is founded on the respect of national and territorial realities, giving the European Union only a limited degree of sovereignty, delimiting its competences and the fields of its intervention avoiding ambiguities” (Lega Nord 2006: 26). As far as the Danish party, Dansk Folkeparti (DF), is concerned, although it is against a European political union, it argues that particular policies can be dealt with at the EU level. Indicatively, the party’s official programme reads: “We oppose the development of the EU which is going towards the United States of Europe. The Dansk Folkeparti wants a close and friendly cooperation in Europe but cooperation should be limited to areas such a trade policy, environmental policy and technical cooperation. We oppose the introduction of a European political union” (Dansk Folkeparti 2008). The above findings indicate that although all of these parties reject the EU framework and seek to limit its competences, they accept the general idea of European cooperation.

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10 Original text: “Die FPÖ ist die einzige Partei, die diesen Wahnsinn ablehnt”.
11 Text in English.
12 Original text: “Die künftige Bestimmung Europas ist in enger Zusammenarbeit seiner Völker zu gestalten. […]Die Europäische Union ist nur ein Teil der europäischen Wirklichkeit. Sie soll sich nicht zu einem europäischen Bundesstaat, sondern zu einem Staatenbund entwickeln”.
13 Original text: “Le Mouvement Pour la France entend garantir, préserver, recouvrer l’indépendance nationale dans une Europe de la coopération des États et des peuples. […]le Mouvement Pour la France propose une nouvelle Europe, une Europe des patries et des peuples”.
14 Original text: ‘si deve cercare di costruire un’Europa fondata sul rispetto delle realtà nazionali e territoriali, cedendo all’Unione Europea solo una limitata parte di sovranità, delimitando chiaramente le proprie competenze; vanno delimitati con precisione gli ambiti di intervento dell’Unione Europea, evitando norme ambigue ed indefinite”.
15 Original text: “Vi er modstandere af udviklingen i EU, som går i retning af Europas Forenede Stater. Dansk Folkeparti ønsker et tæt og venskeligt samarbejde i Europa, men samarbejdet skal begrænsettes til områder som handelspolitik, miljøpolitik og teknisk samarbejde. Vi er modstandere af indførelsen af en europæisk politisk union”.
Finally, the ‘compromising’ type includes parties which clearly accept the principle that nation-state cooperation should occur at a European level and that the practice of integration has brought considerable economic advantages domestically. Moreover, these parties do not propose an alternative framework of cooperation, such as the confederation argued by some parties belonging to the ‘conditional’ type. Rather, they seek reform within the EU’s structures actively promoting their national interest. Furthermore, they are not active proponents of any future cooperation that would take the form of a deeper political union.

The Italian party, AN, is in favour of an EU that is a champion in the field of technology, energy and the Lisbon Agenda. The party is also in favour of the reduction of the transatlantic technology gap with particular focus on the energy security, the liberalisation of the market, the completion of the Trans-European Energy networks, the support for renewable energy. It also states that: “Today Italy cannot any more entrust itself to Europe, it should also contribute to remake Europe” (Alleanza Nazionale 2006: 13)\(^{16}\) taking into account the Italian specificity. Similarly, the Polish party, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), accepts the existing framework of the EU for European cooperation. However, it actively seeks to strengthen Poland’s position within the EU. It has stated: “At the European Council meeting in June, we minimized regulations that were harmful to Poland from the rejected Constitutional Treaty” (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 2007: 52).\(^{17}\) This is because the party fears that the EU is dominated by the strongest and most economically developed states, and that Polish interests are likely to be overshadowed. Moreover, the Dutch party, Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP),\(^{18}\) “recognises the benefits and opportunities of European integration. But at the same time it cautions against the dark side of it”\(^{19}\) (ChristenUnie and Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij 2004). It wants European cooperation and integration on the policies where the member states themselves cannot solve the problems, including the environment and agriculture. SGP does not want a European super-state, but an effective Union with realistic goals. The above clearly demonstrate that these parties have accepted that they should promote and strengthen their country’s position within the existing structures of the EU. In other words, they have accepted to play by the ‘rules of the game’.

Table 3: Extreme right nationalist party positions on European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party positions on European integration</th>
<th>Rejecting</th>
<th>Conditional</th>
<th>Compromising</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Vlaams Belang</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Front National</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore</td>
<td>Lega Nord</td>
<td>Alleanza Nazionale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Liga Polskich Rodzin</td>
<td>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</td>
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\(^{16}\) Original text: “Oggi l’Italia non può più affidarsi solo all’Europa, deve contribuire a rifare l’Europa”.
\(^{17}\) Original text: “Podczas Szczytu Rady Europejskiej w czerwcu br. zniwelowaliśmy niekorzystne dla Polski zapisy odrzuconego projektu Traktatu Konstytucyjnego”.
\(^{18}\) SGP has a joint European manifesto for 2004-2209 with ChristenUnie. However, ChristenUnie is not included in the analysis because it does not score more than 15 in Benoit and Laver’s dimension (see footnote 3). The party has a mainstream conservative rather than extremist/ultraconservative character.
\(^{19}\) Original text: “ChristenUnie en SGP erkennen de voordelen en kansen van Europese integratie. Maar benoemen tegelijk eerlijk de schaduwzijden ervan”. 
The findings of the comparative research undertaken on the various party manifestos provides supporting evidence of the relevance of the three-fold typology of party-based Euroscepticism presented in this article, namely ‘rejecting’, ‘conditional’, and ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism. Through the framework of this typology, this section has substantiated the fact that contrary to the assumption in the literature, extreme right nationalist parties oppose European integration to a different extent. Therefore, the importance of this typology not only lies in improving the conceptualisation of the term by setting concrete criteria of measurement, but very importantly in demonstrating significant policy divergence within an otherwise similar party family. This divergence is explained with reference to a party’s ideological identity, to which this article turns.

**Dimensions of political contestation**

Having argued that there are three types of Euroscepticism within European extreme right nationalist parties based on a three-dimensional conceptualisation of European integration, the article proceeds by addressing why these parties adopt dissimilar positions on Europe. More precisely, it addresses the question “how does an extreme right party’s ideological identity connect to its Euroscepticism?” In answering this question, this section of the article discusses the two-dimensionality of European party systems and presents the derived hypotheses. It argues in favour of breaking the left-right axis of political contestation into its two constituent parts, namely the socialist-capitalist axis and the authoritarian-libertarian axes. This is a useful strategy for the purposes of this article because it reveals important differences between the parties under investigation and demonstrates how the ideological profile of the party connects to different levels of Euroscepticism, which is discussed in the last section of the article.

**The structure of political conflict in European party systems**

The literature on comparative politics acknowledges that “Most theories of political behaviour assume that the dimensionality of the political space is exogenously determined by social or value divisions” (Hix 1999: 72). Political parties respond to these societal value divisions and are constrained by the political space, which is consecutively constructed in their domestic party system. According to Kitschelt, the three values captured by the slogan of the French Revolution “liberty, equality, fraternity” are the principal social values endorsed by citizens in every political context and are responsible for creating dichotomies of interests. Each of these values “envisions societal end-states associated with different, at times complementary, but more often conflicting modes of social organisation” (Kitschelt 1994: 9). Consequently “the programmatic content of political competition in contemporary democracies constitutes nothing but the perpetual struggle to cope with the trade-offs among the three ultimate values” (Kitschelt 1994: 9), which are translated into social practice.

The first societal value refers to the *liberty* in the market, namely the trade-off between market and planned allocation of resources. The value of *equality* relates to the principle of collective organisation binding all members of the society. These two values “mutually presuppose each other [and] beyond a threshold the two principles are associated with rival forms of organisation” (Kitschelt 1994: 9). This occurs because on the one hand, proponents of the value of equality over that of liberty tend to prefer formal collective forms of political and economic organisation, usually provided by a strong state, over spontaneous market allocation of resources among groups and individuals. The political decision on this trade-off has been a major source of political polarisation in modern democracies. It epitomises the political answer to the question of how scarce resources must be allocated and which decision-making procedure must regulate this process. Because as mentioned above these two values presuppose one another, they are depicted in the literature by a single dimension of political contestation. This is the ‘distributive’ axis illustrating the decision on the economic allocation of resources. Here, this axis is referred
to as the socialist-capitalist axis, the socialist pole indicating state-planned economy and egalitarian distribution of resources whereas the capitalist end of the axis representing complete market allocation of resources and economic freedom of the individual.

The third value, fraterniy, refers to the communitarian social order. The trade-off here is between exclusive and inclusive structures of the community and social values exemplified by on the one hand independent self-organised communities and paternalistic societal hierarchy on the other. This trade-off is depicted in the authoritarian-libertarian axis of political contestation and includes primarily positions on several non-economic societal issues. This axis is independent from the distributive axis because the choice over the social aspects of the community does not tend to predict the choice on the allocation of resources. In other words, there is the theoretical and practical possibility that a libertarian supports either market allocation of resources or state intervention. Similarly, there can be both economically right-wing and left-wing authoritarianism. While it is true that economically left-wing socialist parties are likely to be libertarian, this does not exclude the possibility of a capitalist libertarian party, such as some liberal parties. The same applies to authoritarianism. Right-wing authoritarianism is more likely to occur but this must not preclude left-wing authoritarianism, including (post-) fascist and hard communist parties.

Based on the above, which are derived from Ktischelt’s (1994, 1995) work on political parties, as well as Marks and Steenbergen’s (2004) findings on the interaction between European integration and national political conflict, this article assumes that the European national party systems are essentially two-dimensional. In other words, there are two major issues of political division within each party system that cut across each other. On the one hand, the socialist-capitalist axis expresses the class conflict over resources. It depicts the contestation over economic redistribution, welfare and regulation of the economy. On the other hand, the authoritarian-libertarian axis portrays the contestation over non-economic social issues and the structure of the community, and “captures conflict about traditional values rooted in a secular/religious divide” (Marks et al. 2006: 157). These two dimensions summarise how actors position themselves on major issues and, on the basis that they cut across each other, four quadrants of a party’s ideological identity are observed. These are clockwise the libertarian-socialist, libertarian-capitalist, authoritarian-capitalist and authoritarian-socialist.

Given that positions such as left-libertarian and right-authoritarian are comparatively more common than intervention-authoritarian and free market-liberalism, scholars including Hix (1999) and Benoit and Laver (2006) have subsumed the two axes into a single left-right dimension. The left-right axis has been the traditional way to represent deeply-entrenched ideological views containing both positions on the economy and the structure of the community in a parsimonious manner, especially when mapping and explaining major differences among party families. However, when analysing differences and similarities within party families, as is the aim of this article, breaking economic and social divisions into two dimensions of political conflict cutting across each other has the significant advantage of providing the researcher with much more detail and accuracy on each party’s positions. This is particularly relevant when it comes to extreme right nationalist parties. These parties score high values on the left-right axis when this represents the fusion of their positions on social and economic divisions because of their high authoritarian scores on social issues. This, however, conceals the fact that some of them pursue socialist-type economic policies, namely the preference for public spending, higher taxes and state control of resources instead of spontaneous market allocation and lower taxation. Therefore, although subsuming the social and economic dimension into the left-right axis of political contestation tends to increase parsimony, breaking them into two dimensions undeniably increases accuracy. Moreover, it indicates that there are growing numbers of conflicts that resist assimilation into a single dimension, which is particularly relevant when it comes to mapping and explaining intra-party family qualitative differences on levels of Euroscepticism.
The hypotheses

The literature on political parties suggests that in contemporary political systems there are three main types of choices relevant to political parties, which “provide the critical dimensions along which opinions and beliefs in democracies may vary” (Kitschelt & McGann 1995: 4). These are choices of who is a citizen, which decision-making procedures are best for the society, and how scarce resources should be allocated. As far as citizenship is concerned, there is a distinction between a broad inclusive definition and a narrow exclusive one. This polarity can be described as “a conflict between the ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘particularist’ conceptions of citizenship” (Kitschelt & McGann 1995: 4). Regarding collective decision making procedures, “the alternative is between individual freedom of political and cultural expression, combined with participatory choice procedures of collectively binding policies, at one extreme of the continuum, and collective norm compliance, combined with hierarchical choice procedures, at the other” (Kitschelt & McGann 1995: 4).

The first two types of choices, namely the choice of who is citizenship and which decision-making procedures must govern the community, are aspects of the political division depicted on the authoritarian-libertarian axis of political contestation. More precisely, Libertarians demand greater individual autonomy shaping personal and collective identities, the transformation of gender roles, and an ethic of enjoyment rather than of accumulation and order” (whereas “the new authoritarianism values a ‘natural’ hierarchical community, deference to political authority, the return to a stable patriarchal division of labour between the sexes, and an ethic of personal discipline. (Kitschelt 1994: 22-23)

Concerning the third main political choice, namely the choice over economic resource allocation, the distinction lies between those that prefer market allocation and flat taxation regardless of income and those that advocate egalitarianism in resource redistribution. In other words, this is a choice between on the one hand market liberalism and egalitarian redistribution of resources on the other, which is best depicted on the socialist-capitalist axis.

Since national political systems are structured around the two abovementioned main dimensions of conflict (socialist-capitalist and authoritarian-libertarian) and since the EU is also a political system rather than an international organisation (Hix 2005), this article suggests that party positions on the above dimensions of political contestation can also explain degrees of support/opposition to European integration. This is because the EU as a system by its institutions and policies has taken a concrete stance on these issues. It promotes structures and policies of inclusion rather than exclusion, of cosmopolitanism rather than particularism, and of participation rather than patriarchy/hierarchy. For instance, the EU promotes inclusive citizenship structures which include, since the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992), a common European citizenship. It endorses cultural tolerance and social inclusiveness demonstrated for example by the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. Moreover, the EU encourages pluralistic decision-making structures demonstrated in the subsidiarity principle and the strong focus on regional government as well as market liberalisation and capitalism promoted by among others the Single Market.

Related to and deriving from a party’s position on the authoritarian–libertarian axis of political contestation, it is hypothesised that:

1. A party supporting highly authoritarian social arrangements of the society and maintaining a very narrow and exclusive idea of citizenship is more likely to oppose European integration compared to a party supporting less authoritarian values.

Related to, and deriving from, a party’s position on the socialist–capitalist axis of contestation regarding economic resource allocation, it is hypothesised that:

2. A party supporting market allocation of resources is less likely to oppose European integration compared to a party that supports strong egalitarian distribution of resources.
Here, it must be mentioned that although extreme right nationalist parties share general ideological characteristics and operate in a similar ideological political space, they display a degree of dissimilarity in terms of their position on the two axes of political contestation. The following section examines whether and how this dissimilarity is associated with the parties’ different levels of Euroscepticism.

**Extreme right nationalist party mapping**

This section explores the analytical value of the hypotheses presented above. It uses party mapping as its methodology and the data provided by Benoit and Laver’s (2006) expert survey in a sample of 11 extreme right nationalist political parties. More precisely, it locates patterns of party positions on the two axes of political contestation and assesses whether particular party combinations of positions on the two axes relate to particular types of Euroscepticism.

**Data**

The data used in this article is drawn from the Benoit and Laver (2006) research on party policy positions, which has used systematic surveys by country specialists. This data has been selected because it was the most comprehensive at the time of writing given that the sample includes a high number of extreme right nationalist parties. The authors have compared their findings to party scores derived from content analysis of party manifestos by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge 2001) and have found that the estimates of both projects widely agree. They obtain a relatively good linear fit between the two methodologies (N=114, \(R^2=0.40\)), which substantiates the validity of their estimates (Benoit & Laver 2006: 142-143).

In their survey, Benoit and Laver (2006: 6) asked country experts “to locate party policy positions, in the party systems of which they had expert knowledge, on a set of predefined policy dimensions”. They chose the policy dimensions based on the literature on policy and party competition in Europe as a whole, but also drew upon the literature devoted to individual countries. As a result, they display party positions on general political dimensions, including those relating to the economy and social issues, but also to country-specific issues such as nationalism and immigration.

Based on the above discussion on the two-dimensionality of European party systems, the data provided by Benoit and Laver is used in a manner that allows this article to display where the parties under investigation are positioned on these two axes. The party positions on the socialist-capitalist axis have been calculated on the basis of party scores on Benoit and Laver’s policy dimension “taxes versus spending” (Benoit & Laver 2006: 228). More precisely, the authors have calculated party positions on a linear dimension in an ordinal manner ranging from value 1, indicating that a party strongly promotes raising taxes in order to increase public services, to value 20 that shows that a party strongly promotes cutting public services and taxes. This policy dimension fully captures the socialist end of the spectrum, which advocates complete state intervention in order to ensure economic egalitarianism. It also portrays the capitalist pole that represents the complete economic freedom of the individual.

Party positions on the authoritarian-libertarian axis have been calculated on the basis of party scores on Benoit & Laver’s policy dimension “social policy” (Benoit & Laver 2006: 228). This dimension captures party positions on matters including abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia and ranges in an ordinal manner from value 1, measuring liberal policies on social issues, to value 20 which indicates complete opposition to liberal policies on such matters. However, the authoritarian-libertarian axis does not only depict party attitudes on social issues but also, as Marks et al. (2006: 157) have argued, the authoritarian pole indicates traditionalism/authority/nationalism. As a result, this article also takes party
nationalism and attitude to immigration into account. Since Central and Eastern European countries have not yet witnessed major immigrant inflows, the expert survey has not considered party positions on immigration in these countries. Instead, the survey has considered Central and Eastern European parties’ nationalism as opposed to its cosmopolitanism, namely its approach to history, culture and national consciousness (Benoit & Laver 2006: 129-130). Similarly value 1 indicates a party that strongly promotes a cosmopolitan rather than a national consciousness and value 20 indicates the opposite (Benoit & Laver 2006: 230). For the parties operating in Western Europe the expert survey has measured their attitude to immigration. In this dimension, value 1 indicates a party favouring “policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into the host country”, whereas value 20 reveals a party favouring “policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin” (Benoit & Laver 2006: 229). As mentioned above, nationalism and attitudes to immigration are important issues which are also captured by the authoritarian-libertarian axis. Therefore, the position of Western European parties on this axis has been calculated as the sum of party scores on the policy dimensions ‘social’ and ‘immigration’ divided by two. For the parties of Central and Eastern Europe, their position on the authoritarian-libertarian axis has been evaluated as the sum of party scores on the dimensions ‘social’ and ‘nationalism’ divided by two (see Appendix A).

Results and discussion

Based on the above discussion on party data, figure 1 below displays party scores on the two dimensions, value 10 representing a centrist position. The 11 parties researched in this article have considerable differences both regarding their economic agenda and their social policy agenda. Parties including the Polish LPR and the Italian MSFT have a much more socialist economic agenda scoring values significantly lower than 10. Moreover, the Italian AN and the Danish DF have an economic policy very close to the centre scoring 10 and 10.1 respectively. Another important observation is that all parties, apart from the Polish PiS, score higher than 15 on the authoritarian-libertarian axis. An attentive eye can also discern that five parties score higher than 18 on the same axis. These are the Belgian VB, the French FN, the Italian LN and MSFT, and the Polish LPR. The most important point here is that the parties’ economic agenda displays significant variation from moderately socialist to highly capitalist whereas although the variation in their authoritarianism is not comparatively as great, there are a few parties that display particularly high scores.

Figure 1: Party scores (Data ranging from 1 to 20); Source: Benoit & Laver (2006)
Figure 2 (below) is the visual representation of the party positions on the two axes cutting across each other. The horizontal axis displays party positions on the socialist-capitalist dimension and the vertical axis represents party positions on the authoritarian-libertarian dimension. Figure 2 illustrates the additional information regarding the parties’ Euroscepticism. More precisely, the round marks indicate parties utterly opposing Europe, namely the ‘rejecting’ type of Euroscepticism. These are from left to right the Italian MSFT, the Polish LPR, the Belgian VB, and the French FN. The triangle marks represent parties that display a ‘conditional’ position on European integration. These are from left to right the Danish DF, the Austrian FPÖ, the Italian LN, and the French MPF. The square marks stand for the parties that have adopted a milder and ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism. These are from left to right the Italian AN, the Polish PiS, and the Dutch SGP.

**Figure 2**: Party scores on two axes (Data ranging from 1 to 20)

```
Libertarian
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
```

**Note:**
- rejecting Eurosceptics; ▲ conditional Eurosceptics; ▣ compromising Eurosceptics

**Source:** Benoit & Laver (2006)

**The pattern**

The additional information provided in figure 2 displays important patterns that relate to a party’s Euroscepticism. First, the four parties in the sample that belong to the ‘rejecting’ Euroscepticism type score particularly high values on authoritarianism, namely higher than 18. However, they adopt both socialist and capitalist-type economic agendas. In other words, they display mixed economic policies. Second, the three parties that adopt a ‘compromising’ attitude on European integration score comparatively much lower values on the authoritarian-libertarian axis, namely less than 17. They also adopt solely centrist and capitalist economic policies. Third, the four parties belonging to the intermediate ‘conditional’ position on Europe have comparatively more mixed characteristics. They
score both high and less high values on the authoritarian-libertarian dimension being close to both the ‘compromising’ and the ‘rejecting’ Eurosceptics in terms of their authoritarianism. Yet, they are similar to the ‘compromising’ Eurosceptics because they also display only centrist and capitalist economic agendas. This is summarised in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Dimensions of politics and Euroscepticism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party scores on the two dimensions</th>
<th>High Authoritarianism (higher than 18)</th>
<th>Less High Authoritarianism (lower than 18)</th>
<th>Socialist economic politics</th>
<th>Centrist economic politics</th>
<th>Capitalist economic politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rejecting</td>
<td>Yes (MSFT, LPR, VB, FN)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (MSFT, LPR)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (VB, FN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional</td>
<td>Yes (LN, MPF)</td>
<td>Yes (FPÖ, DF)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (DF)</td>
<td>Yes (LN, MPF, FPÖ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromising</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (AN, PiS, SGP)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (AN)</td>
<td>Yes (PiS, SGP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The parties utterly ‘rejecting’ European integration display consistently particularly high values of authoritarianism (higher than 18) but mixed economic policies. This indicates that although very high scores of authoritarianism are associated with a party’s ‘rejecting’ Euroscepticism, the economic policy does not play a role. The group of parties belonging to the ‘compromising’ category of Euroscepticism is the most coherent in that it displays consistently centrist/capitalist economic agendas and relatively lower values of authoritarianism (lower than 17). This suggests that low levels of authoritarianism coupled with capitalist economic policies are associated with low levels of Euroscepticism. Regarding the group of parties adopting a ‘conditional’ view of Europe, the findings are mixed. Although they are diverse in their authoritarianism scoring both high and less high values, they tend to support centrist/capitalist economic policies. Overall, the findings show that the parties, which do not utterly reject Europe, adopt centrist/capitalist economic policies rather than socialist. This indicates that when a party is not highly authoritarian, its centrist/capitalist economic policy plays a role in deterring the party from ‘rejecting’ European integration.

Two important conclusions can be drawn from the above patterns. First, if a party displays very high levels of authoritarianism, its economic agenda does not have a demonstrated impact on its Euroscepticism. Its authoritarianism is so high that minimises the potential effect of its economic policy. This result is consistent with previous research that has found that Euroscepticism is bi-polar and is mainly expressed by radical left and radical right parties. According to Marks et al. (2006: 163) “[t]he radical Left views European integration as an elitist capitalist project that isolates decision making from citizens in the interests of powerful corporations. Radical Tan20 parties view European integration as an elitist supranational project that weakens national autonomy and traditional values.” High levels of authoritarianism influence a party’s European agenda independently of its economic agenda. This is why both radical left and right parties reject the EU and European integration. Second, all the parties that refrain from adopting a ‘rejecting’ position adopt centrist/capitalist economic policies and comparatively lower levels of authoritarianism. Therefore, a party’s centrist or centrist/capitalist economic agenda plays a significant role in deterring the party from ‘rejecting’ European integration.

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20 The author prefers to refer to the authoritarian-libertarian axis as ‘Gal-Tan’, which stands for Green/Alternative/Libertarian versus Traditionalism/Authority/Nationalism.
discouraging parties from utterly opposing European integration when parties are less authoritarian.

These findings confirm the two hypotheses of this article. Relating to the first hypothesis, parties that support highly authoritarian social arrangements and maintain a very narrow and exclusive idea of citizenship ‘reject’ European integration. What is more, parties that adopt moderately authoritarian values refrain from utterly uncompromising positions, which further corroborates the first hypothesis. This is demonstrated by the fact that all ‘rejecting’ Eurosceptics are highly authoritarian whereas all ‘compromising’ Eurosceptics are comparatively much less authoritarian. The second hypothesis is also confirmed because the parties that do not reject European cooperation as a whole, namely the ‘conditional’ and ‘compromising’ Eurosceptics, support centrist or centrist/capitalist economic policies.

Conclusion

This article has mapped and explained opposition to European integration within the European extreme right. It has presented a three-dimensional conceptualisation of European integration, which refers to the principle, the practice, and the future of European integration. The principle denotes the wish and willingness for cooperation at a European multilateral level. The practice of European cooperation/integration indicates the institutional and policy status quo of how the EU functions. The future suggests enthusiasm for uploading more policies to the EU level, i.e. the deepening of integration. This conceptualisation of integration provides the criteria on the basis of which the typology of Euroscepticism has been constructed. The typology identifies three types of Euroscepticism. First, the ‘rejecting’ type, which includes parties wholeheartedly against any multilateral cooperation at a European level, supporting principles of national self-determination. Second, the ‘conditional’ type comprising parties not against the principle of cooperation at a higher European level but against the practice of the EU framework and the future deepening of integration. Third, the ‘compromising’ type, which contains parties accepting both the principle and the practice of EU cooperation but oppose future integration and a deeper political union. The findings of the comparative party manifesto research conducted in this article provide supporting evidence of the relevance of this typology of party-based Euroscepticism. Extreme right nationalist parties adopt these three different positions on Europe. The Belgian VB, the French FN, the Polish LPR, and the Italian MSFT belong to the ‘rejecting’ Eurosceptics. The Danish DF, the French MPF, the Italian LN, and the Austrian FPÖ display ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism. The Dutch SGP, the Italian AN, and the Polish PiS are ‘compromising’ Eurosceptics.

This divergence is explained with reference to the two-dimensionality of party systems in modern European democracies. The article positions the 11 parties on the two dimensions of political conflict, namely the authoritarian-libertarian and the socialist-capitalist axes, using data provided by the expert survey by Benoit and Laver (2006). The main findings of the article are that first, parties that ‘reject’ European integration are highly authoritarian and display both socialist and capitalist economic policies. Second, parties that choose not to ‘reject’ Europe, i.e. the ‘conditional’ and ‘compromising’ Eurosceptics, adopt centrist/capitalist economic policies and comparatively lower levels of authoritarianism. Therefore, confirming the article’s hypotheses, high levels of authoritarianism are associated with strong opposition to European integration. Moreover, centrist and capitalist economic policies discourage parties from ‘rejecting’ Europe. However, the impact of a party’s economic agenda is only discernible when the party adopts less high authoritarian values.

This article has been innovative in many ways. It explores and demonstrates the extent to which extreme right parties deviate in terms of their position on European integration arguing that this difference can be explained by their respective positions on the two main dimensions of political contestation at the domestic level. From a methodological
perspective, it suggests that a party manifesto approach is particularly pertinent in the comparative study of Euroscepticism and can lead to remarkable findings. Lastly, the typology devised for this study improves the academic conceptualisation of the term by providing a novel framework for analysis of party-based Euroscepticism, which can be widely applicable to other party families, including communist and agrarian.

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References


Quaglia, L. (2003). 'Euroscepticism in Italy and centre-right and right wing political parties', *Opposing Europe, Sussex European Institute Working Paper No 60*.


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Appendix

Wording of the end points of each policy dimension considered in this article as presented in the Benoit and Laver survey (2006: 228-230)

ECONOMIC POLICY: TAXES VERSUS SPENDING
• Promotes raising taxes to increase public services. (1)
• Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes. (20)

SOCIAL POLICY
• Favours liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (1)
• Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (20)

IMMIGRATION (dimension specific to Western European countries)
• Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into ______ society. (1)
• Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin. (20)

NATIONALISM (dimension specific to post-communist countries)
• Strongly promotes a cosmopolitan rather than a ______ national consciousness, history, and culture. (1)
• Strongly promotes a ______ national rather than a cosmopolitan consciousness, history, and culture. (20)

How the data table was constructed

The values on the dimension socialism-capitalism are the same to the values that parties have scored on Benoit and Laver’s policy dimension “taxes versus spending”. The values on the dimension authoritarian–libertarian have been calculated on the basis of party scores on Benoit and Laver’s three policy dimensions, namely the dimensions “social policy”, “nationalism”, and “immigration”. For Western European parties, the data have been calculated as the sum of party scores on the policy dimensions “social” and “immigration” divided by two. For Central and Eastern European parties, the data have been calculated as the sum of party scores on the policy dimensions “social” and “nationalism” divided by two. Below is the table of the data used in the third section of the article.

Data table for each party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Socialism versus capitalism</th>
<th>Libertarian versus Authoritarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alleanza Nazionale</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front National</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lega Nord</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liga Polskich Rodzin</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>19.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement pour la France</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>17.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>16.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlaams Belang</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Benoit and Laver (2006)