What model for CFSP?

Hans-Georg Ehrhart
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Hans-Georg Ehrhart
The author

**Hans-Georg Ehrhart**
is a Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Head of the European Security Policy Department of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. He is also a member of the ‘Team Europe’ of the European Commission’s Representation in Germany. He has held various visiting research appointments in Bonn, Paris and Kingston (Canada), dealing with the general topic of peace and security. He has published widely on such issues as disarmament, peacekeeping, conflict prevention, post-Soviet politics and Franco-German relations, as well as on European security and defence policy.
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Should Europe be a ‘space’ or a power, and, if the latter, a civil or military power? For many years these alternatives have informed the debate on the purpose of European integration and the way the Union acts on the international stage. These are admittedly two extreme models, each of which can justify and legitimate a certain form of external action by the Union. Each has been fuelled by the differing cultures and historical legacies of member states. Some have favoured military interventionism while others have followed a more abstentionist policy, reflecting the diverging conceptions of the relationship that the European Union should have with the United States, on the one hand, and the Union’s attitude to the notion of power itself on the other. But as conceptual models they, along with other variants such as the idea of normative power or concepts of collective security, have without doubt helped to explain all the positions, pleas and reservations of member states on the Union’s future as an international actor. The Maastricht Treaty is no doubt the most ambiguous, but also the most harmonious, summary of these views of the Union’s foreign and security policy.

Ten years after Maastricht, the Union is obliged to reorientate its foreign, security and defence policy in the light of two major developments: forthcoming enlargement and the changed nature of international violence. At the same time as the threat of terrorism hangs over Europe’s citizens and they are calling for greater security in Europe, the Convention on the Union’s future has begun looking at a complete review of the objectives, means, procedures and missions of what will be a common foreign and defence policy ‘at 25’. While it is at present difficult to foresee what European model will emerge from all of this, it at least seems fairly safe to predict the end of the two extreme models of twenty years ago. Europe will be neither a great absolute power in which all states agree to intervene together in every case nor simply a civil ‘space’ within which there is arbitrary, reversible cooperation on a national level. The Union has now gone beyond the false dilemma of omnipotence or inexistence on the international scene. But what will it become?

That question – what form the CFSP might take – is addressed in this Chaillot Paper by Hans-Georg Ehrhart, an Institute senior visiting fellow in autumn 2001 and currently Deputy Head of the European Security Policy Department of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg. The theme running through the study is the idea of cooperative security. In a systematic comparison of the principles underlying the
Union’s external action and the recent acquis of the CFSP and ESDP, the author proposes a foreign policy model based on an overall – civil and military – concept and a multidimensional approach to EU security. At a moment when clouds are building up over the security of all of the planet, and the very principles on which the international system is founded – multilateral regulation, respect for the rule of law, a minimal codification governing the use of force – are likely to be called into question, this Chaillot Paper sets its sights on the demands of democracy in foreign policy and calls for a form of European Union that is able to reconcile the realism of power and adherence to the component values of the European project itself.

Paris, October 2002
An opinion poll throughout Europe, conducted by Eurobarometer and released in July 2001, indicated increasing scepticism and indifference among Europeans towards the ongoing process of European integration. Following these findings, EU foreign ministers acknowledged ‘that an abyss had opened up between European citizens and their institutions’. The citizens of the four largest member countries in particular are increasingly dissatisfied with the way in which the EU is run. Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel concluded that ‘the link between the Union’s objectives and the actions it takes through its policies is no longer clear’.

Against this background, the heads of state and government expressed their wish (in an annex to the Treaty of Nice) to start a broad and comprehensive public debate on the future of the EU. They expressly defined four tasks: the principle of subsidiarity, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the simplification of the treaties, and the role of national parliaments, although they did not touch specifically upon the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). A year later, the European Council decided to convokes a Convention in order to ensure ‘that the preparation for the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) is as broadly-based and transparent as possible’. In the annexed Declaration of Laeken CFSP/ESDP issues were – again – scarcely mentioned, which is astonishing, given that the importance of foreign, security and defence policy for the EU is generally acknowledged. The Secretary-General and High Representative (SG/HR) of the EU, Javier Solana, has declared that the ESDP is to be the EU’s principal integration project of the decade, following the successful introduction of the euro.

A public debate on CFSP/ESDP is becoming all the more important, since the original goals of the European project – the maintenance of peace, stability and prosperity – run the risk of disappearing from the popular consciousness.
Currently, politicians seem not to need to worry about such a debate, because public support for the development of CFSP, including the defence dimension, appears to be relatively high. This is an exception to increasing scepticism towards European integration in general. In a Eurobarometer survey on the most important tasks of the EU conducted in autumn 1999 shortly after the international intervention in Kosovo, the tasks of peacekeeping and security arrangements ranked second, with 89 per cent, just one point behind combating unemployment. The Eurobarometer of mid-2001 confirmed the upward trend in support for both CFSP (65 per cent) and ESDP (73 per cent). Since spring 1995, support for both has varied between 60 and 68 per cent, and 60 per cent and 75 per cent respectively. The figures indicate that CFSP/ESDP is one of the most popular European policies, and that the EU has public consent to develop this field of competence.

However, the figures do not indicate what kind of foreign policy should be pursued. It is a sensitive issue that came to the fore in a dramatic way after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. An EU-wide opinion poll on the international crisis generated by the events of 11 September revealed mixed support for the deployment of troops to Afghanistan (48 per cent for, 43 against). In contrast, the survey showed huge support for the provision of humanitarian aid (90 per cent); preventive action to ensure that the conflict did not spread to other countries (85 per cent); restoration of democracy (84 per cent); and generous finance for reconstruction (70 per cent).

The debate on the future character of CFSP/ESDP must tackle a host of related problems. It is essential to question what kind of security the EU is aiming for, and how the EU’s approach to security has adapted to changes within the international environment since the end of the 1980s, including the events of 11 September 2001. It is also essential to identify how the main objectives of CFSP can be implemented, and what significance a policy of effective conflict prevention will have. What future role can the military assume in handling international crises? What other instruments are necessary for crisis prevention and management? Against this background, the central question posed for this analysis is: what kind of role should the EU aspire to in today’s international security environment?

In answering this question I take a structural-functional perspective to analyse the EU as an actor, rather than the perspective

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10. Ibid. p. 37 and Eurobarometer 55, op. cit.
of the different EU member states. This paper begins with a short discussion of various models for the EU as a civilian, military, and normative power and the impact of the changing international environment on future security challenges. In the face of these challenges, I propose that the EU’s CFSP should evolve following the model of what I term a ‘cooperative security provider’. This model is based principally on a set of ideas that subsequently serve as criteria to evaluate to what extent the EU complies with the model and what it could do to comply with it further.

A guiding model – what for and which one?

Models for the EU’s international role

Since the end of the Second World War, the European project and a number of conceptual models for its development have evolved side by side. These models have resulted in a mixture of competing political interests, normative designs and concepts of international order. For example, at the time of the Hague Conference and the creation of the Council of Europe in 1948, the idea of a ‘United States of Europe’ was discussed. Later on, the concept of European integration emerged. This soon absorbed several concepts of Europe, viewed both as a process and as a political goal. The model of federalism and ‘confederalism’, including liberal, conservative and socialist perspectives, was disputed.

The debate on the international role of the EC/EU from the 1970s to the 1990s, as well as the corresponding models fuelling the debate, evolved along with the international context and the level of European integration. During this period three models for the EU’s international role were discussed.

A civilian power

The civilian power model was popularised by François Duchêne in the early 1970s. He correctly stated that, from the beginning, the idea of European integration contained two basic aspects: one that emphasised reconciliation between former enemies and possible contributions towards world peace, and another that was based on power ambitions. The changing international context at that time was characterised inter alia by growing economic competition between Western Europe and the United States, as well as by the normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it was also characterised by a new step forward in the European integration process following the efforts to create a political
Union and the EU's enlargement through admission of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. These developments led this author to mark this time as a turning point, where the EU had to decide which road it should take. Three paths were available to follow based on the superpower, neutral and civilian power models.

Duchêne himself preferred to push for Europe as a civilian power. His basic idea was that Europe would not be able to defend itself over long periods of time, and that growing economic interdependence necessitated collective management by leading powers. In order to become a respected player, the EU would have to become more cohesive, and that equally applied to the field of security. The aim, however, would not be to replace the US security guarantee but to reinforce it in order to reduce any Soviet temptations and resist security-economic bargaining pressure from the Americans. The EU was essentially designed to be a cooperative actor that would implement common actions inside and outside the Community. It was characterised by the civilian nature of both its means and its ends. To support this model, Duchêne pointed to three specific contributory factors: the 'political genius' of the West European culture, the unique situation of Europe, in terms of its political and military ruin following two world wars (resulting in the European population being the least militarised in the world); and finally, the nuclear stalemate, which devalued the currency of military power and enhanced civilian, in particular economic, influences.

A military power

Nearly a decade later, Hedley Bull criticised the concept of the EU as a civilian power by arguing that it was a 'contradiction in terms'.\(^{16}\) The international context at that time was framed inter alia by growing international quarrels about 'Soviet expansionism', the missile crisis following NATO's double-track decision on nuclear modernisation and arms control, the future of détente and the EU's 'Eurosclerosis'. Against this background, Bull's central theme was the military vulnerability of the countries of Western Europe. His conclusion that West Europeans 'should take steps towards making themselves more self-sufficient in defence or security'\(^{17}\) was backed by three arguments.

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17. Ibid., p. 152.
First, Bull pointed to a serious divergence of interest in transatlantic relations in several central policy areas. The root cause of this, he argued, was the inability of Europe to take on a greater share of defence, possibly giving Europe greater influence within the Atlantic Alliance. Second, the Soviet Union constituted an ongoing threat. Hence, if Western Europe dissociated from the Alliance, and therefore from its reliance on Washington, it would have to maintain the balance of power in Europe by itself. Third, Bull emphasised, ‘the first business of any community is to provide for its security’. The development of Europe’s own military potential would both speed up West European reforms, he suggested, and be appropriate to its status in terms of wealth, skills and historical position.

Subsequently, Bull outlined several conditions which would be necessary before a real Europeanist strategic policy could be possible. First, Western Europe needed to provide itself with its own (minimum) nuclear deterrent forces. Second, it had to increase the size and quality of its conventional forces. Third, West Germany needed to play a greater role in security issues. Fourth, France needed to stay committed to the Gaullist approach. Fifth, the United Kingdom needed to change its policy. Sixth, careful attention had to be given to the reactions of the superpowers. Finally, West Europeans needed to develop ‘an appropriate form of political and strategic unity’.

A normative power

A third representation of the EU’s power in international relations can be subsumed in the model of a normative power. Duchêne’s civil power approach already in some respects referred to the basic idea of diffusing civilian and democratic standards. For political scientists such as Johan Galtung, ideological power is the power of ideas. This, Galtung argues, is manifested in culture, and plays a significant role in the assessment of the international role of the EU. Especially following the end of the East-West conflict, the study of international norms and the normative dimension of the EU became a focus of scholars’ attention along with the rise of the theory of social constructivism in the analysis of international relations. Ian Manners, for example, suggested that the EU represented neither a civilian power nor a military power, ‘but a norma-
itive power of an ideational nature characterised by common principles’. He described international norms as ‘a shorthand way of expressing what passes for “normal”’. In other words, a normative power is characterised by its ability to shape standards of common sense.

The EU’s normative power is manifested in its well-developed set of norms, which range from founding principles expressed in its treaties (liberty, democracy, rule of law, human rights) to objectives (social progress, anti-discrimination, sustainable development), as well as European Council conclusions such as the Copenhagen criteria expressed in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. These norms are more than just declaratory aims because they represent crucial constitutive features of a polity which creates identity as being more than a state. They are also valid for the EU’s external relations, because they constitute external sources of influence. These norms define the international identity of the EU.

The core question in discussions in the 1980s and 1990s was what kind of international actor the EU was or should be – civilian or military. In Panos Tsakaloyannis’s view, the EU had already lost its civilian power posture in the early 1980s. When outlining developments in the CFSP/ESDP in the late 1990s, Karen Smith came to the conclusion that the EU ‘is now abandoning its civilian power image’. Interestingly, Christopher Hill distinguished the civilian power model from that of a power bloc, emphasising the inclusion of the use of economic power for political ends in a power bloc, but the exclusion of military force. However, using Hanns Maull’s understanding of a civilian power, the EU has no choice but to maintain its civilian status. The member states accept the necessity of cooperation in the pursuit of international objectives. They concentrate on non-military means, regarding military power as only a last resort. They are, however, also willing to develop supranational structures in order to address critical issues in international affairs. Maull’s concept of a civilian power does not completely rule out the use of military force as a means to defend European principles, if that option is unavoidable.

All these models have strengths and weaknesses. They are competing abstractions of a complex ‘real world’. They help to provide an overview of alternative political visions of the EU. The models have been developed in different historical contexts and have been

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23. Ibid., p. 32.
24. Ibid., p. 33.
29. Maull’s understanding of civilian power comes nearest to my prescriptive model of the EU being a cooperative security provider. However, his model still sticks to the civilian-military dichotomy, though mainly in its wording. One reason for this may lie in the fact that Germany and Japan are his objects of analysis; another could be the intention to keep a link to the broader concept of civilisation of Norbert Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, 2 Bde (Bern and München: Suhrkamp, 1969).
adapted in several ways. On the one hand, the civilian power model has evolved into a normative power model, whilst leaning away from military aspects of power. The military power model, on the other hand, has either been dismissed as unrealistic or moulded into a civilian power model that encompasses the use of military means. The validity of these models for the EU is controversial, since they are either outdated, context-specific or too simplistic to address real challenges in a complex world.

**The new security dilemma**

In the early 1990s, James N. Rosenau used a theoretical framework to explain what he called the ‘turbulence in world politics’. At the global level, Rosenau argues, the emerging new structure is a bifurcated system, consisting of a state-centric world and a multi-centric world. The sources of power are much more varied, fostering diffuse relationships. Loyalties are widely dispersed and contingent upon the performance of the actors; they are no longer directed towards the state authority or legitimacy derived from it. At the subnational level, Rosenau suggests, there are relatively autonomous units in loosely organised flat hierarchies and networks. Power derives from numerous, well-organised and/or wealthy groups with widely diffused sentiments of loyalty and legitimacy, as well as a readiness to defy directives from the national level. In general, people become increasingly interactive and interdependent.

Rosenau’s critical point is that the advent of the post-industrial era, with its technological and social dynamics, is at the heart of global turbulence. The developing environment changes both positively (by providing opportunities) and negatively (because of the attendant risks), the way in which international policy-making or international relations work. The consequence is what has been called ‘post-international politics’, a term that Rosenau uses to suggest ‘the decline of long-standing patterns without at the same time indicating where the changes may be leading. It suggests flux and transition even as it implies the presence and functioning of stable structures. It allows for chaos even as it hints for coherence. It reminds us that “international” matters may no longer be the dominant dimension of global life, or at least that other dimensions have emerged to challenge or offset the interac-

Turbulence means uncertainty and can lead to violent conflict or war. The question is whether the use of force as a response to turbulence will become more or less frequent. The answer depends partly on the changing nature of conflict. Although there is a clear trend towards a limitation on the use of violent coercion in the so-called OECD ‘world’, this does not mean that the whole world is heading for an era of perpetual peace. States will continue to maintain their ability to exert coercion and to wage war. However, this will be a less viable and credible way of exercising control over other actors, especially if they are non-state actors.

In the paradigm of the ‘new security dilemma’, states are challenged much less by states than by social forces that act following different rules and pursue multiple and competing objectives within different time-frames, utilising a range of coercive means. The fact remains that the mode of coercion that has become predominant is intrastate, low-intensity conflict. For example, in the year 2000, approximately 90 per cent of all wars were intrastate wars, fought by regular and irregular armed forces. The traditional security dilemma on the other hand is based on interaction between states in search of one-sided security, leading to a vicious circle of armament and counter-armament, thus undermining the initial goal of security. With the ‘new security dilemma’ there is a greater division of benefits in a globalised economy, and a declining possibility of states being able to deal with defectors of all kinds within the international order. There are many more incentives, especially for non-state actors, to defect from international rules, norms, and values, which creates insecurity. Cerny, however, points out that attempts to impose security through intervention, ‘can create backlashes which interact with complex globalisation processes to create new sources of uncertainty: overlapping and competing cross-border networks of power, shifting loyalties and identities, and new sources of endemic low-level conflict.’

Terrorism fits into the picture of low-intensity conflict. This kind of violence has often been mentioned in the context of failed states and societies. These are characterised by social fragmentation, violence and deprivation. Such a context is likely to be the breeding ground, or offer a favourable environment, for terrorism.

31. Ibid., p. 6.
33. See, for the definitions of war and armed conflict and the statistical data, www.sozialwiss.unihamburg.de/ipw/Akuf/kriege00_text.htm.
However, terrorism is not a new phenomenon. According to Martin van Crevelt, terrorism as a mode of low-intensity conflict is as old as war itself. He highlights three principal characteristics of present low-intensity conflicts: they

- tend to occur in underdeveloped countries;
- usually involve regular armies on one side and irregular forces on the other, be they called guerrillas, bandits, terrorists or freedom fighters;
- do not primarily rely on high-tech collective weapons, which are ‘the pride and joy of any modern armed force’ but are not of much use in low-intensity conflicts.

What is new, however, is the perception of the ongoing privatisation of violence as a fundamental threat to international security, and also the strength of international reaction to terrorist acts. In November 2001 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemned acts of international terrorism for the first time as ‘one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century’, recognising in this context ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter’. NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history. The EU adopted several common positions on combating terrorism. On 16 January 2002, the UNSC adopted, again for the first time in its history, a resolution introducing extraterritorial sanctions against al-Qaeda, a transnational non-state actor.

The rise of violent intrastate conflicts, as well as the use of new, or seemingly new, forms of coercion as policy instruments, can be interpreted as an expression of post-international politics. These types of conflicts have not yet put at risk the existence of Western states, however they have the potential to undermine regional stability. They can also threaten citizens’ and states’ interests and values, irrespective of whether they are directly or indirectly involved in conflicts. The same applies to the basic norms of the national and international order, as well as to the legitimacy of national and international institutions.

In consequence, states and international actors react by engaging in intrastate violence or conflict more often than in the past. Individuals, groups and transnational actors react similarly. In an interdependent world, the formerly hallowed principle of sovereignty is increasingly called into question and security cannot exclusively be provided on the national level. As one scholar has

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36. Ibid., pp. 205 ff.
put it, we are witnessing ‘the development of a “common-risk” society’. At the centre of new security thinking in post-international politics is what UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called ‘human security’. According to the statements of leading politicians such as President Bill Clinton or Prime Minister Tony Blair, made at the 54th UN General Assembly in Autumn 1999, humanitarian intervention will be a central task of international politics in this decade.

Since the events of 11 September the fight against terrorism has been identified as another crucial mission. Unfortunately, it took the appalling terrorist attacks on the United States for the international community to pay due attention to this kind of transnational threat. However, one could get the impression that the United States is acting once again following the traditional, state-oriented approach. What started off as a war against the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation quickly turned into a war against the Taliban government of Afghanistan, with the potential to expand against the ‘axis of evil’ states – Iran, Iraq and North Korea – in future. On the one hand, the prospect of interstate war is a clear mission that US forces could carry out. On the other, this kind of traditional approach not only misses the initial goal but runs the risk of causing further regional instability.

It is widely recognised that there has been a radical change in the nature of the international system since the end of the East-West conflict. But the breakdown of the Soviet Union and its empire is not so much the cause of this process as a symptom of a complex change in world society. For some politicians it took more than ten years to realise that the East-West conflict had definitely ended. Some of them are now trying to use the terrorist attacks of 11 September to back their plea for more military hardware of the traditional kind. However, these kinds of instruments have only a limited impact in asymmetric conflicts against an enemy who does not have a face and is neither a state, a government nor an army. Three issues ought to be considered:

- the typical environment of failed states that serves as a breeding ground for the emergence of a terrorist threat;
- the possibility of coopting defectors through the increased availability of benefits;
- the consequences of post-modern low-intensity conflicts for the structure, equipping and doctrine of armed forces.

The controversial debate on humanitarian intervention or the war on terrorism is outside the scope of this paper. What is important is the fact that both issues are the expression of a much more fundamental debate on the dynamics and character of violent conflicts in our turbulent world. I would argue that the popular rhetoric of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the ‘war on terrorism’ only conceal the deep crisis in traditional defence and security thinking. Without appropriate recognition and adaptation we will not be able to deal adequately with the new security dilemma. On the one hand the world is shrinking and becoming more vulnerable due to rapidly advancing technologically-driven interdependence, but on the other hand it is characterised by deepening cleavages between and within societies. If states are not able to satisfy basic social needs such as those expected in the broadest sense of ‘security’, they will (probably) be confronted with social fragmentation, politicisation of ethnicity and a destructive search for group identity, which may end in a pathological path towards violence and destruction.46

The new security dilemma cannot be dealt with through the traditional approach of defence and security policy with clear-cut definitions of interest and threat, and corresponding military instruments. However, the challenges of the new environment have to be dealt with because of the negative effects they might have on regional and world order. The problem is that these effects only become evident slowly and indirectly. They are diffuse and often only perceived as relevant if a conflict leads to a high number of atrocities and human rights violations being shown on TV screens, or to what has been called ‘hyper-terrorism’.47 If these cases arise, governments may come under intense public pressure to ‘do something’, which may result in military activism, escalating costs and little in the way of positive results.

The security provider model

In the face of these challenges, I propose that the EU’s CFSP should evolve following the model of what I term a ‘cooperative security provider’. This model is based principally on the following five ideas, derived from the changed international context and the new security dilemma.
Nordivism
The use of military power has to be checked by civilian norms as defined in international public law. The main role of military power in the post-modern, non-traditional understanding is to transform conflicts from violent into non-violent forms of action, to provide a minimum of deterrence as well as a sufficient defence capability and ultimately to contribute to comprehensive security.

Appropriateness
External relations have to keep up with both the security-political challenges of our troubled world and the expectations of its people. Thus, security policy has to cope with the real challenges of world society, which range from post-industrial interdependence, globalisation and integration on the one hand to fragmentation, failing states, the erosion of sovereignty and transnational threats on the other.

Inclusiveness
A policy dealing with complex challenges has to embrace all aspects of power. The controversial debate on the use of civilian and military power, and their interaction, basically reflects two different approaches. However, it does not provide for a realistic and acceptable model. On the one hand, a civilian power without military means would lack an important instrument for keeping or shaping international order. On the other hand, military means can only cope with a limited range of these challenges. Thus the model has to be inclusive and overcome the artificial assumption that civilian and military approaches are exclusive.

Multi-level orientation
The bifurcation of the post-international system into a world of states and a world of sub-state actors has led to a proliferation of actors who exert influence on a given situation. The complexity of the security challenge renders non-state actors indispensable for dealing effectively with problems that are essentially social in nature. Thus these kinds of actors must be integrated into the security approach.
Multilateralism
Coping with the new challenges to peace and security requires intensive multilateral cooperation. Actors have to be sufficiently strong and attractive to be able to contribute to the shaping of an international order. At the same time, they have to cooperate closely with international lead organisations in order to strengthen regional and global norms and institutions.

Taken together, these principles, which form the core of the cooperative security provider model, represent a policy that aims at what could be called ‘international security governance’. There are, from my point of view, at least two compelling reasons for the EU to follow the cooperative security model: first, it consists of a wide range of policies and instruments and therefore allows for a comprehensive response to the complexity of today’s security environment; second, it corresponds to the EU’s own nature: the EU itself is the prime example of multilateralism, a collective entity with a body of law, built on cooperation and integration. At the same time, EU member states have a strong preference for diplomacy over the use of military force. After a century of European ‘civil war’ this preference might be questioned to a certain degree, but it seems deeply rooted in the collective memories of Europe’s peoples and unlikely to disappear. Consequently, even if the EU one day plays an important international role, it will certainly not become a military superpower like the United States. The cooperative security provider model therefore seems best suited to both Europe’s specific needs and the new security challenges of the twenty-first century.

However, the model itself will only play a guiding role for CFSP if the CFSP fulfils three conditions: first, it needs to be defined with reference to a specific historical and social context; second, it will only gain relevance if both the normative and actual interpretations of security policy correspond with one another – CFSP must be socially accepted; third, it must be translated into maxims for action whose purpose is the implementation of the model. For the EU, five such maxims can be developed.
1) Normative dimension
There needs to be an adequate set of norms and values which guide the EU’s foreign policy actions, thereby enhancing international stability and peace. If proclaimed norms and values and foreign policy actions diverge, the process of identity building and international credibility will be severely damaged.

2) Conflict prevention
The main emphasis should be on conflict prevention. Prevention is always better than cure. Besides, such an approach gives rise to lower political, financial, economic, moral and human ‘costs’ than traditional approaches.

3) Institutions and instruments
Adequate institutions and instruments should be developed. It does not make any sense to declare good intentions that unfortunately cannot be put into practice because of a lack of both functioning institutions and appropriate civilian and military instruments. These instruments are not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for the forming and enforcing of the political will of EU member states.

4) Operational culture
A new operational culture needs to be created. The nature of conflict has changed, and with it the operational environment. There is an urgent need for a re-think on civil-military relations. As James Rosenau puts it, ‘The state-centric and the multi-centric world need to be combined in a cooperative and efficient way.’

5) Cooperation with OSCE/UN
Cooperation with international lead organisations needs to be intensified. A division of labour between the EU, OSCE and UN should be developed. Furthermore, the tricky question of mandating has to be tackled. This is an extremely important issue because it concerns international legitimacy and legality.

48. See the definition of prevention in Chapter 2.
These maxims for action can serve as criteria to measure the extent to which the EU already conforms to the model of a cooperative security provider. What kind of international actor the EU will become in reality has still to be determined. It is obvious that the EU is much more than a nineteenth-century concert of powers, each member state balancing the other through power politics and shifting alliances. Nor is it a hierarchical state model. The EU can be described as an evolving multilevel decision-making system in which member states predominate in CFSP matters but are increasingly tied by legal acts through common strategies, joint actions and common positions, as well as by a trend towards federalism encouraged by the necessity of efficiency. In the next chapter, the extent to which the EU complies with the above-mentioned criteria will be examined.

49. We might see a process used in the second pillar similar to that of the first one. Member states calculate that external strength is generated by common action based on greater internal coherence. Coherence is built by harmonisation and institution building, leading step by step to a full-size policy system in order to cope efficiently with an external conflict. See Reinhard Rummel, ‘Regional Integration in the Global Test’, in Reinhard Rummel (ed.), Towards Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Community (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), pp. 27 ff.
Assessment and recommendations

The normative dimension

As discussed above, the concept of security is changing, driven by the international environment. This is leading to a broader understanding of security beyond those interpretations that prevailed during the period of the East-West conflict and which were primarily focused on territorial defence and survival of the socio-political system, including its values and norms. Today, two critical questions are: whose security are we talking about, and what are the values to be defended? The answers are – as they always have been – normative. The crucial shift today is in regard to the beneficiary in security matters. On the one hand, the beneficiary is no longer exclusively the state but more and more the individual. On the other hand, the values to be protected are increasingly connected with human rights. The traditional role of the state as a sovereign power is being challenged. The emergence of new security issues and actors makes it increasingly difficult for the state acting alone to control the course of events. Consequently, it increasingly relies on international cooperation and multifunctional or hybrid security organisations that were designed to deal with varying security challenges and tasks.

For instance, NATO has tried to adapt to the new circumstances by reforming its politico-military defence organisation into a hybrid security organisation. NATO claims that it is a guarantor of stability beyond the borders of its member states by virtue of cooperation and crisis management. At the same time, the task of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of its member states remains the same for NATO as before.\(^50\) In parallel, the EU is adapting to the new environment by deepening and widening its structures, embracing inter alia the ESDP project in order to be able to cope more effectively with challenges to peace and security.\(^51\)

Another consequence of the declining role of states is a growing interest in strengthening the normative and legal dimension...
of the ‘post-international’ system. International politics is becoming more and more a system of rights and duties in which actions, especially in the realm of security, need to be reasonable in terms of any cost-benefit analysis and justifiable in international law if they are to be considered legitimate. In this context the issue of human rights is attaining increasing validity within an evolving system of international law. It is obvious that human rights policy can only be a part (albeit an important one) of foreign policy, and that power politics and national interests will continue to matter in the new international environment. However, the changing international context requires a more enlightened interpretation of national interest.

Thus we can conclude that, in the new international context, ‘security policy increasingly becomes an instrument to uphold the law rather than an instrument to defend self-interest in a system of anarchy. Respect for democracy and human rights become conditions for security.’ Whether this view of the evolving post-international system will prevail and find widespread support depends to a certain degree on how the EU and the CFSP develop. Whereas this is also valid for NATO, European integration goes beyond such a basis. The EU encompasses a broader area of responsibility, which is mirrored by the three-pillar structure. Furthermore, it is a more ambitious political endeavour. Despite the fact that it is evolving slowly and without a common understanding of its finalité politique, it seems to be developing into a new, semi-federal actor or entity.

The primary condition for such a process is not only the compatibility of basic norms and values, but also mutual trust that has to accumulate through common experience and actions as well as through a certain symmetry of interdependence, politico-structural similarity and the existence of a variety of channels of cooperation and communication transcending the governmental level. All these factors are valid for the EU member states. Additionally, there has to be a purpose for the formation of a common identity which is, for the EU, inter alia the establishment of a peaceful and united Europe.

This is especially the case if one bears in mind current challenges from both the forthcoming enlargement of the Union and its repercussions, as well as the existing and potential conflicts over the EU’s borders and beyond. From a historical perspective, the creation of a peaceful community among the member coun-

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52. The latest most obvious steps are the international criminal tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, setup by the UN Security Council and the establishment of a standing International Criminal Court (ICC). The EU is a strong supporter of the ICC. It is expected to pay for almost three-quarters of its budget. See International Herald Tribune, 1 July 2002, pp. 1, 6. Whereas in the current Bush administration the prevailing view is that international law is only for the naïve, but, ‘an unravelling of international law threatens to tear apart the fabric of the European Union, as the premise of the Union is that states can make legal agreements with one another’. See Dan Plesch, Sheriff and Outlaws in the Global Village (London: Menard Press, 2002), pp. 22 f. See, for the US arguments against the ICC, Robert Kagan, ‘Europe should be more sensitive to American concerns’, International Herald Tribune, 1 July 2002, p. 8.


54. In political debate, the ambiguous notion of a ‘federation of nation states’ has become popular. In legal terms, the integration process is described in the Treaty on European Union as ‘the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. The present state of the EU has also been characterised as a ‘tightly coupled security community’. Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 56 f.
tries of the EU was the main purpose of the integration process. The hubris of nationalism which led to two world wars and tremendous human suffering and devastation, but also the threat of nuclear annihilation during the Cold War, constitute a fundamental experience which had a deep impact on the forming of a European identity and provided for a common sense of belonging in terms of a community of values.

Against this historical background, the EU has been widely regarded as a model to overcome and resolve deeply rooted conflicts between its member states. It is classified as being a ‘democratic peace’, as international relations theorists have called it. To encapsulate this approach, democracy is premised on a causal relationship with peace. Democracy can be characterised by features such as the separation of powers, pluralism, rule of law and the protection of human rights. Consequently, democracy is not only a system of rules but also a system of norms and, above all, gives preference to peaceful change. However, whereas academics have convincingly argued that wars among democracies are unlikely, the concept of a causal relationship between democracy and peace has empirically been proved wrong. Thus, democratic states or coalitions of democratic states do not necessarily pursue a peaceful and non-violent foreign policy.

Furthermore, the reasons for the recourse to military means by democracies in the past have not been limited to self-defence. In the 1950s, democratic states used military force in colonial wars, and throughout the Cold War for the maintenance of spheres of influence. Further examples of why democratic states employ military action include the maintenance of international order, e.g. the Gulf War; humanitarian reasons, e.g. Kosovo; or the fight against terrorism. The first two of these contingencies are excluded as policy options for the EU. However, the last three might gain relevance within an evolving ESDP. Although Art. 17 TEU states that the CFSP ‘shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence’, it exclusively refers to the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ (Art 17.2), i.e. humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The task of combating terrorism is not mentioned expressly. Nevertheless the EU sees itself as ‘one of the leading partners of the global coalition against terrorism’. 55 Ten days after the 11 Sep-

tember attacks, the European Council declared that the fight against terrorism would ‘be a priority of the European Union’. In general, terrorism is perceived as a real challenge to the world and to Europe. As to the specific attacks by al-Qaeda, these have been condemned as ‘an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies’. Consequently the Union has called for ‘the broadest possible coalition against terrorism, under the aegis of the United Nations’, the aim being ‘to defend our common values’. This approach is covered by the remit of the TEU.

If one looks closely at the normative dimension of the CFSP as defined in Art. 11 TEU, the first two objectives are seen to be ‘to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in accordance with the United Nations Charter’, as well as ‘to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways’. In other words, the security of member states should be maintained against whatever threat, including terrorism, faces them. Moreover, the subsequent objectives relate not only to stability in general but also to member states’ individual security: ‘to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders’, as well as ‘to promote international cooperation’. Finally, according to the Treaty, the CFSP will help ‘to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’. That means the EU seeks to export the norms of its own peaceful order beyond its own borders in order to enhance stability and peace.

According to the preamble of the TEU, the whole CFSP endeavor has essentially two normative functions: the reinforcement of European identity and independence, as well as the promotion of peace, security and progress in Europe and the world. In other words, CFSP is not confined to Europe, as some like to maintain, but implies a global approach corresponding to universal values and fundamental rights, and indeed to all the challenges and risks attributed to the globalization process. However, if only for geographical reasons, Europe remains at the centre of this approach.

The export of stability does include the use of force in line with the principles of the UN Charter. The normative problems that the EU member states are facing in this context are threefold. First,
legitimacy and respect for national and international law is of utmost importance to Western societies, but the existing legal norms do not match the new challenges of internal and transnational violent conflict. However, does it necessarily follow that there is a right of pre-emptive military action, as favoured by the Bush administration? And should the EU, as a British diplomat recently suggested, adopt double standards and navigate, like the United States already does, ‘between the postmodern and the premodern world’? Second, opposing groups, bands or networks largely adhere to other systems of norms, values and beliefs. Does the fight against these forces justify violation of the most entrenched principles of democracy and respect for human rights? Third, the need to combat low-intensity conflict ‘will cause regular forces to degenerate into police forces or, in case the struggle lasts for very long, mere armed gangs’. How can the slide down this slippery slope be halted?

Recommendations

In sum, the EU has developed a comprehensive and consolidated set of norms and values that are also reflected in the objectives and guidelines of CFSP. This normative set is characterised by a broad understanding of security that goes beyond the mere absence of war. It aims in particular to embrace both the gradual export of the EU’s system of peace to other European countries, through a widening process, whose limits still have to be defined, and it also comprises a declared intention to be engaged globally in order to enhance peace, security, prosperity and development around the world. However, the prospect of becoming engaged by using military force raises normative questions that still have to be tackled.

The EU is a strong advocate of human rights, and this is reflected in a range of foreign policy actions. As a community based in law, the EU’s foreign policy actions are restricted in principle, although every country is free to interpret international law and common values in practice. This relative freedom of manoeuvre might decline in the wake of the slow but ongoing rapprochement of the different national security systems. This process could, however, be furthered by observing the following recommendations:


63. Martin van Cleevelt, op. cit., p. 207.
The development of a ‘European White Book on Security and Peace’ could mark an important step towards supporting the rapprochement of security cultures, although the difficulty of putting abstract norms and values into practice in CFSP/ESDP will remain.

Another challenge is the problem of double standards, a permanent threat to the internal and external credibility of any international actor. The link, therefore, between values and norms as regards specific foreign policy activities has to be stated in a convincing manner.64

Coping with old and new threats in an adequate way without running the risk of damaging the EU’s basic values and norms will certainly be a challenge. The debate on US treatment of al-Qaeda prisoners in Guantanamo Bay is a good example. It hints at the general problem of dealing with non-state actors who do not care about rules of warfare and international law, instead following a totally different ‘rationality’. However, one general guideline should be to strengthen the rule of international law and implement it through multilateral international agreements and actions.

The EU should not participate in pre-emptive military actions without the approval of the UN Security Council.

The EU should not subordinate the international principles of human rights to considerations of efficiency in its fight against terrorism. It should continue to build a world of true human security by highlighting the links between development, human rights and democracy.65

Conflict prevention

Actors who evolve as security providers undoubtedly have to focus on a policy of structural and acute conflict prevention. Structural, early or long-term conflict prevention is directed against the root causes of conflict, whereas acute, short-term, late, operational or direct conflict prevention seeks to prevent an escalation of existing crises into widespread violence.66 The challenge of the structural approach lies in its broad policy scope, which involves a wider range of actors necessitating close coordination and cooperation. The fundamental problem of acute prevention is that it is more reactive than proactive. Generally, prevention policy (preventive diplomacy) is designed to deal with external situations in which major civil conflict has not yet broken out. The alternative to this

64. The EU engagement in Macedonia is a relatively good example of a comprehensive and well-communicated operation. See Javier Solana, ‘Pourquoi nous sommes en Macédoine’, Le Monde, 25 août 2001, pp. 1 and 11.


66. In this analysis, I use the terms ‘structural’ and ‘acute’ prevention.
approach would be to let conflicts escalate into violence and then either stand aside and let things run their course or become engaged later with the consequence of higher risks in using military force. In this situation the term ‘crisis management’ is usually applied, which the EU defines as ‘actions undertaken with the main objective to prevent the vertical (intensification of violence) or horizontal (territorial spread) escalation of existing violent conflicts.’ In other words, crisis management is also prevention policy, though a belated one. As structural and acute prevention may fail, the international community also needs to be able to take on crisis management tasks.

There are at least four basic reasons for giving preference to prevention over mere crisis management:

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The first reason concerns financial cost. The cost-benefit analysis is a detached but convincing argument. Empirical studies have shown that conflict prevention actually costs the international community less, or would have cost much less, than the conflicts themselves. In other words, conflict prevention is far more economical. As I have mentioned earlier, the laissez-faire option for dealing with regional security is not realistic, because of the risk of regional spillover of conflict. In the case of internal violent conflict, the interests of external powers are sooner or later affected. Refugee aid, loss of economic opportunities, military expenditure and costs for reconstruction and rehabilitation are common financial burdens for external actors. Hence, from an economic point of view, the international community needs to engage in conflict prevention as early as possible.

The second reason concerns domestic political costs. Here, the financial factor plays a major role as well. Especially in democracies, parliament and government are held responsible for expenditure. Policy-makers are therefore well advised to spend their budget effectively (i.e. on conflict prevention, rather than increasing defence budgets). This is especially true if one considers that EU member states themselves face ongoing social and political constraints that will make any significant rise in military expenditure more difficult in the years to come. A further domestic aspect is fragile public support for involvement in violent conflicts. On the one hand, people do not like to see human suffering; on the other, they do not accept failures of armed intervention. Finally, the media and opposition parties can make it difficult for governments that fail in their attempts to deal with violent conflicts.


68. The studies referred to only analysed the cost for outside powers, disregarding the domestic cost for the country and people concerned. See Michael Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance (eds.), The Cost of Conflict (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
The third reason for pursuing conflict prevention is external security. Although the countries of the EU are not directly threatened by internal conflicts, they hold a vested interest in regional stability in their neighbourhood. For example, because of the risk of horizontal escalation the EU needs to be engaged in the Balkans in order to contain, transform, and resolve the crisis there. Another argument for becoming engaged preventatively is the nature of ‘new’ conflicts and related risks such as warlordism, trafficking in arms, drugs and people, terrorism or international crime. These are rather diffuse security challenges that cannot in the first place be met using the military’s traditional recipes. The later these security challenges are dealt with, the more difficult and dangerous the task becomes.

The fourth and probably main reason concerns international order and related norms. Both provide the indispensable framework for regional and international stability, which is a necessary precondition for investment and trade. This is especially valid in a world characterised by globalisation; surely, it is not a single low-intensity conflict that is going to destabilise the post-international system? However, it is the sheer volume of low-intensity conflicts and their effects that lead to an erosion of international order. If the idea that brute force works gains currency, we risk entering a process of de-civilisation that will endanger international order.69

Since the beginning of the 1990s international awareness of the necessity for new forms and methods of conflict prevention has, at least in rhetoric, gained significance. In many speeches, high-ranking politicians have stressed the compelling logic of conflict prevention. International institutions and gatherings such as the November 1999 Presidential Statement of the UNSC and the December 1999 meeting of the Group of Eight Industrialised Nations (G8) consistently highlight the need for prevention. Nearly ten years after the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace called for preventive diplomacy, such an approach to security is beginning to take shape. Meanwhile, some appalling mass killings, such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, have led to much soul-searching about responsibility for this kind of disaster and the implications both for the countries directly involved and the international community as a whole. Experts, practitioners and policy-makers have suggested that a ‘culture of prevention’ needs to be developed.70 The events of 11 September

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prompted high-ranking officials to examine issues related to the root causes of terrorism as well as the question of what could be done in terms of preventive action.\footnote{See for example Financial Times, 15 February 2002 and International Herald Tribune, 31 January 2002.}

Despite these developments, as well as some initial achievements, conflict prevention is, as Michael Lund has rightly diagnosed, ‘still not a regular policy’.\footnote{Michael Lund, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Michael Lund and Guenola Rasamoelina (eds.), ‘The Impact of Conflict Prevention Policy. Cases, Measures, Assessments’, SWP-CPN Yearbook 1999/2000 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), p. 11.} This failure can be explained partly by three general problems:

- The earlier prevention begins, the more difficult it is to identify its special nature. If all politics is prevention-oriented, it will be difficult to tell the difference, and the very notion of prevention will run the danger of becoming an ideological term.

- Structural prevention is a long-term task and therefore largely incompatible with the functioning of modern democracies in our media-oriented societies. Although there is no lack of early warning, politicians (and ordinary people) usually react only if they are directly confronted.

- Typically, few people notice if prevention policy has been successful. Similarly, people are not able to recognise the link between structural reforms and their preventive effects, because it is always difficult to show the reasons why a conflict has not occurred. Sometimes prevention needs to be pursued secretly, for example if very sensitive minority questions are dealt with in the framework of preventive diplomacy, but have to be concealed from the media in order to avoid a possible worsening of the situation.

The challenge of policies focused on prevention does not make prevention an impossible task. On the contrary, one has to deal with both the fundamental and practical challenges. There are, among others, three practical problems that could be tackled successfully.

1. There is conceptual confusion about the essence of the preventive approach. Nowadays, conflict prevention often becomes reduced to acute prevention and equated with reactive humanitarian intervention in ongoing violent conflicts. Although this kind of prevention is part of a crisis cycle, violent conflict does not occur out of the blue but develops step by step. Disregard for this factor would have tremendous practical implications for intervening third parties, because the stage that a conflict has reached determines the appropriateness of the response and the definition of the means. Thus, conflict prevention has to deal with both the root causes of conflict by means of both structural and acute prevention. In both cases a variety of political, economic, legal and mili-
tary measures as well as different types of action will be appropriate. It is important that the overall objective is not simply restricted to avoidance of violence. Long-term structural aspects of conflict, such as underdevelopment, inequitable distribution of resources, weak social structures or undemocratic political systems, must be addressed.

2. The focus is mainly on prevention without giving further thought to the fact that first of all one has to diagnose a particular conflict thoroughly in order to prescribe appropriate ‘remedies’. Crisis prevention is not only about political will and action ‘but getting effective action, or at a minimum “doing no harm”’. The techniques and instruments of the intervening third party need to be deliberately responsive to specific local circumstances if they are to be effective. Thus, conflict prevention needs above all to be based on thorough, objective conflict analysis.

3. The relative failure of conflict prevention can be attributed to deep-rooted organisational habits and associated vested interests. Bureaucratic apparatuses usually act according to well-known procedures and strictly within their spheres of competence. They have difficulties in changing direction and transcending their preserve, especially if there is no discernible political impetus or pressure in such a direction. If a culture of prevention is to be realised, international players will need to assimilate the related know-how and habits; there is no culture without customs. Thus, another conclusion is that there has to be a deeper and wider analysis of conflict prevention, i.e. regular and systematic consideration of what effects every kind of activity regarding a region or country may have in a given or potential conflict situation.

What role does conflict prevention play in the EU’s approach to foreign policy? In the first chapter I mentioned the conflict-transforming function of integration within the EU. The integration of young south European democracies such as Spain, Portugal and Greece during the 1980s played a stabilising role. Furthermore, the policy towards the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, which was pursued in the framework of the Yaoundé and Lomé agreements, can be interpreted as an implicit contribution to regional stability. Finally, some CFSP provisions defined in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties correspond to the basic requirements of prevention. They include objectives such as human rights, the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law, and the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks.


However, it was only in the mid-1990s that the EU started to deal explicitly with conflict prevention. In doing so it focused on three areas. First, the Commission and the Council grappled with Africa, using the Conclusions on ‘Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and peacekeeping’ announced on 4 December 1995, the adoption of a common position on ‘Conflict prevention and resolution in Africa’ on 2 June 1997 and the Commission communication entitled ‘Cooperation with ACP countries involved in armed conflicts’ as their starting point. Second, the EU launched its first joint action by initiating the stability pact for Central and Eastern Europe. This successful endeavour was explicitly an act of preventive diplomacy and actions such as the Royaumont Initiative and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe followed. The whole EU enlargement process can be interpreted as an act of structural prevention, especially since a differentiated approach of ‘conditionality’ has been developed. This is also true for the EU’s efforts in promoting regional cooperation and integration on a global scale. Third, the EU has become engaged in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional arms, and the spread of small arms and light weapons, thereby furthering peacebuilding regimes.

A tentative conceptual basis for conflict prevention and management was laid down in a communication from the Commission to the Council several years ago. It is formulated in a four-stage crisis response cycle. The cycle begins in time of peace, with the main emphasis laid on conflict prevention by structural means such as the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In the event of rising tension, short-term preventive measures are then to be put in place in order to de-escalate the crisis. These measures include political dialogue, sanctions, preventive deployment and socio-political stabilisation measures. If conflict becomes violent, the objective becomes one of reducing violence through coercive and non-coercive measures. Subsequently, a phase of post-conflict peace building begins. Instruments such as demilitarisation, arms control, rehabilitation, monitoring, political dialogue and institutional reforms are brought into use. All these measures are aimed at the promotion of structural stability as the ultimate goal.

This cycle set out by the Commission in regard to conflicts in Africa has not, however, been translated into a general political strategy for conflict prevention in the CFSP context – nor has it been translated into a general political strategy for conflict prevention in the CFSP context – nor has it...
been implemented. One reason for this failure may be the fact that the concept was the idea of the development ministers and the DG VIII department of the Commission. In other words, it has been seen as a low-profile topic. Another reason is the lack of coherence and instruments required for such an approach.

There are several reasons why the EU has started to show an interest in conflict prevention. There is a slow but growing awareness that external violent conflict might have significant negative effects on the EU members themselves. Further, as the EU is the biggest world trading power and the world’s greatest donor of humanitarian assistance and official development aid, crisis prevention is a compatible focus. The Commission also has a bureaucratic interest in engaging in conflict prevention. Most instruments come within its area of competence and justify the significant role the Commission wants to play in the field of CFSP. Crisis prevention is, additionally, a relatively cheap and non-controversial policy field that is intended to give the CFSP a higher profile. Finally, some member states have pushed this conflict-prevention agenda for domestic reasons, such as the growing pressure by NGOs and humanitarian organisations, or status-related considerations in the case of the neutral EU member states.

Conflict prevention became more prominent when the ESDP project started. The history of the Kosovo engagement has shown once again that the international community did too little too late to prevent the escalation of a conflict which had been evolving over more than a decade. EU members in particular were confronted with their own inability to act in military as well as non-military conflict prevention and crisis management. At the beginning of the debate on ESDP, however, countries such as the United Kingdom and France were only interested in the military or defence aspect, while the Scandinavian EU members especially feared a militarisation of the EU. Germany adopted a mediating role. While mentioned in the core documents of the European Council of Cologne only in passing, the Helsinki Council elaborated on the need to improve and make more effective use of resources in civilian crisis management.

As for the programmatic aspect, much progress has been made. The joint report of the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission, which was presented to the Nice European Council, contains more than twenty recommendations dealing with the improvement of coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s
conflict prevention approach. The main tasks outlined were inter alia the maintenance of conflict prevention as a fixed priority of EU external action, the establishment and strengthening of priorities in this field, and ‘to movethetimescale for EU action forward, becoming progressively more pro-active and less reactive’. The report, which was the first real effort by the EU to seek better synergy in the field of conflict prevention, was followed by a communication from the Commission containing a long list of actual and potential instruments and suggesting possible future activities in the field of conflict prevention.\(^8^2\) I will not go into detail but will merely concentrate on two important ideas that explain the main reasons for the failure of prevention policy. The first is the notion that ‘there is an evident need for enhanced common analysis of root causes of conflict and of signs of emerging conflict’. The second is based on ‘mainstreaming’. The Commission is taking steps in this direction by developing and integrating conflict indicators in all country strategy papers, as well as using practical programming tools such as a Conflict Prevention Handbook for mainstreaming conflict prevention measures being developed.

The Göteborg European Council endorsed an EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict intended to ‘improve the Union’s capacity to undertake coherent early warning, analysis and action.’ Conflict prevention was described as ‘one of the main objectives of the Union’s external relations’ that ‘should be integrated in all its relevant aspects, including the European Security and Defence Policy, development and trade.’\(^8^4\) The Programme drafted by the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) states that ‘in line with the fundamental values of the EU, the highest political priority will be given to improving the effectiveness and coherence of its external action in the field of conflict prevention.’\(^8^5\) Furthermore, it contains an expression of willingness ‘to set clear political priorities for preventive actions, improve its early warning, action and policy coherence, enhance its instruments for long- and short-time prevention, and build effective partnership for prevention.’ Finally, steps to implement these objectives are explained. It now remains to be seen if and how they are put into practice.\(^8^6\)

The same holds true for combating terrorism. The EU has taken a firm position against terrorism, including states ‘abetting, supporting or harbouring terrorists’ by applying ‘a coordinated

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\(^8^2\) European Council, Nice, ‘Report by the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission on Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of the European Union Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention’, in From St-Malo to Nice, op. cit., p. 212.


\(^8^4\) European Council Göteborg, Presidency Conclusions, op. cit., p. 12.


\(^8^6\) A step in this direction is the Cotonou Agreement, which was signed in June 2000 and governs relations between the EU and the ACP Countries. This agreement for the first time includes a political dimension dealing with issues that were hitherto not considered part of the development agenda, such as enhanced political dialogue, peace building policies, conflict prevention and resolution, human rights, democratic principles and rule of law. See, for an overview, http://europa.eu.int/development/cotonou/overview_en.htm. Other concrete steps are inter alia the development of a watch-list of priority countries based on conflict assessments by the Commission, and the set-up of an early warning process based on overview reports and risk assessments by the Council Secretariat. See GAC, Implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, 9991/02, Brussels, 18 June 2002, p. 3.
and inter-disciplinary approach embracing all Union policies’. However, it sees the development of a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development as a ‘condition for a strong and sustainable community for combating terrorism’. In terms of soft security the EU has a lot to contribute. It currently provides 55 per cent of the world’s development assistance and two thirds of grant aid. According to Chris Patten, 11 September has shown how important it is to support failed states and prevent them from failing in the first place. Therefore the EU must tackle ‘the root causes of terrorism and violence’. However, as structural prevention could fail, the EU must also have the necessary ‘hard’ security instruments to deal with states supporting terrorism as well as transnational terrorism itself.

Recommendations

In sum, I would conclude that the EU has started to pay increasing attention to conflict prevention in its approach to foreign policy. Although the issue has only been dealt with since the mid-1990s, this approach has been gradually developed. Today conflict prevention is – especially on the programmatic level – one of the main policy objectives, and increasing effectiveness has a high priority. At the same time, the EU is one of the most active supporters of prevention. However, specific projects have to be examined to determine whether they have a positive or negative impact on the conflict situation. In the meantime, there is, in principle, consensus in the Commission that there is an urgent need to incorporate prevention activities into the context of its daily work. Conflict prevention must be put into practice within all common policies, such as environment, trade or agriculture. Moreover, these activities have to be incorporated into the second pillar, since – as stated by an insider – conflict prevention has to be ‘part of every relevant aspect of the Union’s work’. Another weakness is the geographical and functional limitations influencing the EU’s prevention policy. There is no central entity capable of conducting a comprehensive long-term assessment and evaluation of preventative engagements. Finally, the main emphasis is, for the moment, on acute prevention in the context of conflict management. This cri-
tique notwithstanding, all in all the EU does comply with the second criterion of being a cooperative security provider. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the political commitment to conflict prevention will be fruitful, bearing in mind differing national security priorities and the tricky problem of coherence. Nevertheless, the following steps could strengthen the EU’s conflict prevention capability:

- A strong commitment with regard to conflict prevention as the central CFSP objective should be envisaged in the context of the TEU in 2004, giving a clear signal on institutionalising conflict prevention.
- In civilian preventive actions the application of Art. 27a TEU on enhanced cooperation should be taken into account in the decision-making process.
- Although conflict prevention and crisis management are two sides of the same coin, structural prevention is in any case the best solution and should therefore be preferred to acute prevention.
- The SG/HR and the External Relations Commissioner should draw up a common yearly report on the EU’s conflict prevention activities, including a list of examples of successful conflict prevention.
- Thought should be given to the question of how national and EU civil servants can be better informed about prevention techniques.
- The planning capacity of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) should be increased drastically.
- Much knowledge on conflict prevention has been gathered during recent years, but it is diffuse and has not been systematically evaluated. Such a task could be carried out in various ways, by revamping the PPEWU, by setting up an agency to act as a central point for processing data on prevention addressed to desk officers and units dealing with conflict and headquarters in the field. Another method could be to merge the Commission and Council Secretariat foreign policy staff.
- Continuing country and conflict analysis is a precondition for an effective early warning system. Therefore, closer cooperation with research institutes and academia should be envisaged.


92. The creation of the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) was a step in this direction. Created in 1997 on the initiative of the Commission and the EP, it became fully operational in 2000. CPN was headed by the Berlin-based Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik on a contractual basis. It has been a focal point for research institutes, experts, academics and NGO’s dealing with conflict prevention, providing the EU institutions with topical and in-depth analysis. Unfortunately the Commission cancelled the contract prematurely. The innovative and promising project was officially closed at the end of 2001.
Instruments and institutions

In order to be able to implement the various steps envisaged in the crisis response cycle, the EU has to develop adequate means. The lack of instruments for civilian and military tasks of crisis prevention and management must be remedied. Furthermore, the institutions need to adapt to the new tasks. As for the civilian instruments, the EU already has a variety of Community instruments for structural prevention at its disposal, but few for acute prevention. The military instruments of the member states had been in a state of decline, and it was not envisaged that they would be employed in an EU framework. Only the sudden evolution of the British position, as expressed in the Franco-British St-Malo Declaration, opened the way to the ESDP. The development of the ESDP made institutional reforms absolutely necessary. Although the EU’s tendency to focus overly on institutions is obvious, there are at least three compelling reasons for reform. First, the existing institutions were ineffective and ill-suited to the new tasks. Second, who else other than the EU could provide a suitable framework for European conflict prevention and crisis management? Third, European integration moves forward by means of common definition of norms and institution building.

New instruments

From the very beginning, the military aspect was found at the centre of the ESDP approach. The main reason was the Kosovo experience, from which it was possible to gain insights into the lack of political structures and military capabilities among EU member states. Furthermore, it was France and Britain that pushed the military capabilities issue onto the European agenda in order to reduce the growing capability gap within the Atlantic Alliance. Consequently, the European Council of Helsinki agreed on the military headline goals. The Helsinki headline goal envisaged that ‘Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.’ Furthermore, the Council decided to develop collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. A first capability commitment conference was held on 20
November 2000. On that occasion, member states committed more than 100,000 soldiers, 400 fighter aircraft, and 100 ships. One day later, 15 European (but non-EU), states made their first commitments. Currently, the quantitative implementation of the headline goal is satisfactory. However, realisation of the qualitative aspects such as mobility, logistics and C3I will be more demanding. At the Göteborg summit deficits were identified and member states committed themselves to ‘specific additional measures in order to address the identified shortfalls’. However, they were not able to adopt a detailed capability development mechanism at the capability improvement conference that took place on 19 November 2001 in Brussels. They did agree on a European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) based on the principles of enhanced effectiveness and efficiency of European military efforts, a ‘bottom-up’ approach to European defence cooperation, coordination between EU member states and cooperation with NATO, and the importance of broad public support. A report on the ECAP shows that the member states have met only 104 of the 144 capability targets. The reason for this is not a shortage of money: the EU countries spend 180 billion on defence. The problem stems from the manner in which the available money is being used. Moreover, member states seem to be reluctant to engage in multilateral solutions.

As to the impact of global terrorism, the SG/HR stated during an informal meeting of EU defence ministers in October 2001 that the fight against terrorism did not make the Petersberg tasks less relevant. However, the ministers concluded the EU member states ought to review their capabilities ‘to ensure that we take full account of the terrorist threat to our forces when deployed on crisis management operations.’ Javier Solana emphasised the importance of improving the information available to policy-makers. This concerned ‘not just the threats posed by terrorism itself, but also assisting in the early warning process, giving advance notice to harmful trends and potential causes of terrorism and other threats to European interests.’ Consequently, he proposed a greater capacity of the Secretariat-General to handle confidential information.

Finally, in its declaration on the contributions of CFSP/ESDP in the fight against terrorism the European Council took a firm and more detailed commitment with regard to action and the development of related instruments.

The decisions on military capabilities have been accompanied by progress in the civilian dimension of ESDP. In order to imple-
ment the goals being defined in the action plan of the Presidency Report on non-military crisis management, an inventory of national and collective resources was set up as a database. Furthermore, a study of the lessons learned in past crises was made in order to define clear future objectives for member states. On this basis the EU identified four priorities among civilian aspects of crisis management, on which it has gradually started to coordinate its efforts.103

The first priority suggested was the provision of policing capabilities. At the Feira summit member states committed themselves to making available up to 5,000 police officers by 2003, 1,000 of them to be deployable within 30 days.104 Procedures have now been developed to meet this target, principles have been defined and two concepts developed, based upon recent experiences in conflict management, and the necessary capabilities identified. The first concept concerns the strengthening of European capabilities and the second the substitution of local police forces.105 Furthermore, a conference of national police commissioners on police capabilities was held on 10 May 2001. Finally, a police action plan has been drafted and partially implemented, criteria for selection, training and equipping of police officers have been developed, principles and modalities for the contributions of non-EU states developed and an exercise programme for police forces approved.106

Activities related to the strengthening of the rule of law were made a second priority. The EU’s approach is aimed mainly at the strengthening and restoration of local judicial and penal systems. A specialist database has been compiled and first targets, such as the contribution of up to 200 officials in order to support the police in criminal justice operations by 2003, have been outlined. Furthermore, common standards and modules for training have been developed since 2001. Finally, in a Rule of Law Commitment Conference held in Brussels on 16 May 2002, it was announced

103. It has been agreed that there might be other priorities for developing collective capacities as well relating to subjects such as small arms, demobilisation, mediation and reintegration. However, they have not yet been given any further consideration.
that the concrete targets set at Göthenburg had been exceeded.\textsuperscript{108}

The two remaining priorities are concerned with civilian administration and the protection of civil populations. In the field of administration general objectives have been formulated, related mainly to the strengthening of overall EU capabilities. Establishing a pool of experts and a database, with capabilities for training and assessment based on common standards and training modules, has achieved this. As far as the protection of the civil population is concerned, quantitative targets have been defined. These include the provision of 2-3 assessment and/or coordination teams consisting of 10 experts in all. The teams could be engaged within 3-7 hours; civil protection intervention teams consisting of up to 2,000 persons available at very short notice are also envisaged, as are supplementary forces including non-governmental organisations and other entities that could be dispatched within two to seven days. The deadline for meeting these criteria is 2003.\textsuperscript{109}

The EU is following a pragmatic approach, as the activities concerning civilian aspects of crisis management outlined above indicate. The Union is concentrating its efforts on operations that deal with the consequences of crisis management, a notable weakness in the past. An important lesson from these experiences is that restoring public security in a volatile environment requires not only soldiers but also police officers, at least rudimentary structures of a penal and judiciary system, and the build-up of local administration. Hence the EU aims to obtain capabilities sufficient to prevent the escalation of violent conflict as well as to stabilise post-conflict situations. In this context it is a primary goal and a most demanding challenge to ensure the coherence and synergy of military and civilian approaches. The main issue at present is the short-term goal of ensuring security through acute crisis prevention and management. The long-term goal of structural conflict prevention can only be reached on that basis.

The Helsinki European Council therefore called on the Commission to set up a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) as part of its formulation of the ESDP. Accordingly, the new RRM budget was approved by the Council on 26 February 2001, and allocated 20 and 25 million for the years 2001 and 2002 respectively. The RRM will enable the Commission to initiate worldwide short-term interventions in a more effective way. It is an effort to overcome procedural, budgetary and geographical barriers that are


hindering the use of Community instruments for effective crisis management. The new mechanism will speed up the capacity for action in fields such as election monitoring, institution building, media support, policetraining, civil emergency assistance, rehabilitation, mediation, etc. The main purpose is to act as rapid stabilisers and lay the foundations for eventual long-term assistance.  

The criticism has been made that the amount of money involved in the RRM is too small compared with the expenditure needed to meet the military headline goals. From a more positive viewpoint it has to be stated that this is the first EU budget allocation for acuteconflict prevention. Themain problem the EU experienced in the Balkans was not a lack of funds but the overlybureaucratised way of handling them. In some cases it took up to eight years for aid to reach its addressee. Hopefully the recent reform of the Commission and its instruments will have a positive effect on this deplorable record. Nevertheless it did not really overcome the general problem that the world is divided into three distinct types of external relations with different Commissioners and Directorates-General.  

Naturally, it will always be possible to find things to criticise, but three points need to be mentioned in this analysis. Some objectives of the four priorities of civilian prevention and crisis management still exist on paper only. So far, most improvements have been made according to the first priority, i.e. arrangements for police forces. One has to bear in mind, however, that the build-up of civilian capabilities is still a work in progress.  

It is a general weakness that the process of creating civilian instruments is based entirely on voluntary contributions from member states. This might lead to free-riding and/or a clumsy implementation of the proclaimed objectives. As in the military field, there is no political will to bind oneself to constraining, Maastricht-like, convergence criteria. It was only after a struggle over the size of national contributions that the ministerial Police Capabilities Commitment Conference on 19 November 2001 finally achieved positive results. Interestingly, this conference took place at the same time as the ‘Capability Improvement Conference’ on military aspects of conflict management, signalling the comprehensive ESDP approach.  

The problem of financing civilian operations still needs to be
resolved. According to Art. 28.3 TEU, ‘operational expenditure... shall also [as the administrative expenditures following Art. 28.2, (H-GE)] be charged to the budget of the European Communities, except for those expenditures arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.’ The expenditure could also be ‘charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.’

An important step towards finding a solution has been made in the context of the proposed European Union Police Mission (EUPM) for Bosnia that will start its operation on 1 January 2003. While France and the United Kingdom in particular favoured the creation of a special fund outside the community budget (not least to sideline the European Parliament and the Commission), to which each country would have to contribute according to its GDP, Germany rejected such an approach for several reasons. Not only would Berlin have had to pay the biggest share of the costs (22 per cent), but the financial planning of ‘Agenda 2000’, defined at the European summit in Berlin in 1999, would have been undermined. The German treasury was also anxious to set a precedent for the financing of future EU crisis management operations. Berlin, which is traditionally more oriented towards integration, favoured the procedure foreseen in the Treaty being used as a rule. In the end, the member states agreed that the start-up costs of 14 million would be financed through the CFSP budget 2002. The 10 million shortfall needed to cover the annual costs of the operation, 38 million between 2003 and 2005, is supposed to be covered by an increase in the CFSP budget (through regrouping within the CFSP budget). In this way the member states were able to find an ad hoc solution for the EUPM. However, they not yet agreed on a general solution for the financing of civilian EU missions.

Institutional reforms

As far as institutional reform is concerned, it was stated above that more progress had been made, although the main impediment to an effective CFSP – the bifurcation of the EU’s foreign policy into two institutional ‘tribes’ – has been reinforced. In order to

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113. TEU, Art. 28.3.
114. Ibid.
115. See GAC, 2409th meeting, Brussels, 18/19 February 2002, pp. 21 f.
116. As to the financing of operations having military implications, the Council approved a general framework which defines principles for identifying two types of costs. Non-military costs of EU military operations are regarded as common costs to be financed in accordance with the gross national product scale, while military costs will be considered as individual costs and will be financed on a ‘costs-lie where they fall’ basis. Costs for headquarters are considered as common costs. Costs for transportation of forces, barracks and lodging will be decided upon on a case-by-case basis. All other costs will be covered by member states taking part in the operation. See GAC, 2437th meeting, Luxembourg 17 June 2002, p. 15.
117. See Gilles Andréani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, Europe’s Military Revolution (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001), pp. 42 ff.
strengthen the capacity to act, important provisions have been introduced into the Amsterdam and Nice treaties. These provisions relate to improved voting procedures such as the possibility of constructive abstention and qualified majority voting – except, in the case of the latter, for questions that have military or defence implications (Art. 23 TEU) – and to the introduction of enhanced cooperation (Art. 27). Furthermore, new political and military or ‘pol-mil’ structures were established, including the post of High Representative for the CFSP (HR, Art. 26) and the setting up of a Political and Security Committee (PSC, Art. 25). Moreover, several subsidiary organs have been created, including the PPEWU (or Policy Unit), the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), the Military Committee (EUMC), and the Military Staff (EUMS). Simultaneously, the Commission has started a reform process with the aim of coping better with the coordination of crisis management tasks.

The creation of the post of High Representative for the CFSP is probably the most important innovation of the institutional reforms. On 18 October 1999, Javier Solana was appointed the first High Representative for the CFSP. The post is combined with that of Secretary-General of the Council. Solana’s two main tasks have been described as follows: he shall assist the Council in CFSP matters through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and he shall act on behalf of the Council through political dialogue with third parties. As Secretary-General, Mr Solana is responsible for preparation of the meetings of the Council as well as of its subsidiary bodies. He heads an administrative structure consisting of around 2,500 officials working in eight different Directorates-General. The Directorate-General dealing with external economic relations and CFSP (DG-E) has been reorganised recently in order to contribute better to initiatives in the context of CFSP/ESDP. Directorates dealing with ESDP (D-VII), Defence Issues (D-VIII) and Civilian Crisis Management and Coordination (D-IX) have been established. The SG/HR can also call upon the expertise of the EUMS.

The SG/HR is intended to give the CFSP both a voice and a face, and possibly evolve into the person whose ‘telephone number’ foreign leaders can call, thwarting any further Kissinger-type complaints. However, it will take some time to reach that goal. Initially, Javier Solana’s focus has been on making the new structures fully operational and developing his own line of approach.
support from member states is concerned, it can be said that the bigger EU member states seem to favour granting him a more important role. In their view, Mr Solana should be given the permanent chair of the PSC in order to enhance both the visibility and continuity of the CFSP. This proposal has however been rejected by other member states, who are concerned that the rotating 6-month presidential system will be put at risk. They fear loss of influence in an area where only the big countries lead the way. Consequently, when a joint action for an operation is being formulated the question of chairmanship will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. For the sake of both swift reaction and enhancing the EU’s visibility in world affairs, governments would be well advised to loosen the reins on Mr Solana.

The SG/HR is supported by the PPEWU. This newly created part of the Secretariat-General, also termed ‘Policy Unit’, was created shortly after Javier Solana took office. In deliberately choosing a less spectacular name, the SG/HR wanted to send a modest signal. This was motivated partly by reservations some member states had with regard to the functions of the SG/HR, as well as suspicion regarding the small team working in this new unit (which consists of around 24 administrators together with some additional staff).

The Policy Unit’s crisis analysis department is officially called the Situation Centre or Crisis Cell. One staff member is appointed from the Commission, ensuring that the so-called ‘coordinating mechanism for civilian crisis management’ – as defined in Helsinki – is taken into account. The Situation Centre (SITCEN) is a joint civilian-military crisis management centre formed by members of the Policy Unit together with the EUMC, thus guaranteeing interaction between the two structures. In a crisis management situation the SITCEN supports the PSC and the EUMC directly. Furthermore, the SITCEN is set up to maintain contact with the situation centres in NATO, the OSCE and the UN.

The Policy Unit has a broad mandate that includes the monitoring, analysis and assessment of international relations, early warning and the drafting of policy options and recommendations. However, it is barely conceivable that the limited human resources – its personnel strength represents roughly twenty per cent of that of the EUMC – will be able to cope with all these tasks.

119. See European Council, Helsinki, op. cit., p. 91.
120. The EUMC has three operational functions: early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. In this context it supplies the SITCEN with military information and receives its output. See European Council, Nice, ‘Presidency Report on the ESDP’, Annex V to Annex VI, in From St-Malo to Nice, op. cit., p. 197.
Although it is located in the same building and mirrors the same functions as the corresponding directorates of DG-E, it is a separate structure of mainly seconded officials. Given its limited capacities, the suggestion that ‘the unit is developing into an extended personal Cabinet of Mr Solana, rather than having the early warning function’, sounds plausible. Early warning and sound analysis, however, are two essential aspects of conflict prevention. Therefore, much more has to be done in this field. Another aspect is the legal status of a majority of the officials. As they are seconded by their national governments, their allegiance is not necessarily to Europe in the first instance.

The PSC was established on 22 January 2001 as a committee comprising national officials, usually of ambassadorial rank, plus a representative of the Commission. The PSC can be chaired by the High Representative, with the agreement of the Presidency. The Committee has the task of monitoring the international situation, delivering opinions and presenting options to the Council, as well as monitoring the implementation of agreed policies. Furthermore, the committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations.

The PSC is intended to play a central role in the area of crisis management by being the pivot of the CFSP where all information, proposals and initiatives concerning an emerging or actual crisis are collated in order to be able to make a comprehensive assessment of the situation. The PSC gives guidelines to the EUMC and receives recommendations from it. The Chairman of the EUMC takes part in PSC meetings if necessary. The PSC also supervises discussions on CFSP in various working parties, to which it may give guidelines. It is supported by the European correspondents and the Commission, who coordinate daily on CFSP business. The PSC provides a privileged forum for dialogue on ESDP with other European and/or NATO partners.

Given the PSC’s key role, it is appropriate that it coordinates both civilian and military instruments. To do this effectively the PSC receives information, recommendations and possible options from the CIVCOM and lays down guidelines on matters falling within the CFSP. During a crisis situation, the PSC has to cooperate closely with the COREPER, a first-pillar body of the principal intermediaries with foreign ministers that plays a decisive role in regard to financial matters.
man of the PSC can participate in COREPER meetings when necessary but has no vote. In a crisis situation, however, the PSC is the sole subsidiary committee with right of direct access to the Council. If the PSC evolves as the linchpin of the EU’s foreign policy, it will be important to strengthen its position in order to bind together the two sides of foreign policy-making. This could be done by operating at the intergovernmental level when it comes to hard security issues and, on the basis of Commission proposals and qualified majority voting in the Council, the usual Community procedures should be applied when dealing with soft security issues.126

The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management was formally established by a Council Decision of 16 June 2000. The Committee is composed of one representative from each member state and the Commission. Formally, it has to report to the COREPER. In practice, however, the link with the PSC is more important, as it provides information to, and receives guidance from, the PSC. The task of CIVCOM is not to coordinate civil-military relations within the EU crisis management system – which is the task of the PSC – but to coordinate all the national agencies related to civil crisis management tasks. For the time being, the main task is to elaborate a framework for civilian crisis management and submit advice to the PSC as well as to other Council bodies. It is not yet clear whether CIVCOM will also assume operational functions, and, if it does, what these functions will be. Should CIVCOM play an operational role, this will certainly cause trouble with regard to the Commission, since – given CIVCOM’s intergovernmental nature – it would be able to influence Community affairs.

The ongoing reform of the Commission is intended to contribute to the EU’s capacity to act in the field of external relations. On the one hand, coherence with the second pillar (CFSP) has to be guaranteed, while on the other the instruments of the first pillar (EC) have to be examined and adapted to the new challenges resulting from CFSP. The complexity of this undertaking becomes clear if one looks at the EU’s system of pillars, according to which different instruments have to be applied following particular decision-making procedures. In theory, this problem could be solved by either merging the intergovernmental pillars with the first pillar, i.e. by ‘communitarisation’, or by re-transfering responsibilities from the Community to member states. As these

126. See: Andriani, Bertram and Grant, op. cit., pp. 46 f.
approaches cannot currently be envisaged, for political reasons, it is particularly important to improve inter-institutional cooperation.

The Commission is an indispensable partner for conflict prevention and management for several reasons. Firstly, it has at its disposal the vast majority of the civilian instruments for dealing with potential root causes of conflict. Secondly, the Commission manages financial resources. While the CFSP budget amounts to only 38 million, the Commission has billions of euros at its disposal. As the Commission is one of the main providers of development aid, it has a significant role to play in conflict prevention. Thirdly, it has the manpower. The number of Commission personnel who could contribute to crisis prevention tasks amount to over 20,000 (15,000 in Brussels), plus those working in 111 delegations (in addition to 17 offices) throughout the world. If there is an international crisis the Commission is usually already at the scene.

According to Art. 27 TEU, the Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP. Consequently it has sought to adapt its work to the new tasks. A first step in the Commission’s reform process was the restructuring of external relations. The current Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, has to coordinate his portfolio with other relevant portfolios. The main idea is to improve the quality of projects, speed up their implementation, simplify contract procedures and end delays in payment. Moreover, Mr Patten interacts with the SG/HR and the Council, and is intended to guarantee that the Commission pursues a coherent foreign policy. He is supported by the Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX), which comprises the units responsible for security policy and Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management within the CFSP directorate. RELEX plays an important role in dealing with conflict prevention within the Commission, notably through the drafting of Country Strategy Papers. In addition a crisis coordination centre was created in mid-2002 that is to coordinate the Commission services in a crisis situation. This new centre could significantly speed up Community action in the event of a crisis.

Another reform aims at improving the management of external aid and support. At the beginning of 2001 the new EuropeAid Cooperation Office was created to handle the greater part of the aid and assistance projects. The main function of EuropeAid is to
dovetail short- and long-term conflict management measures more efficiently. It is supervised by a board chaired by the Commissioner for External Relations. The membership of the board includes the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, who acts as the Chief Executive, as well as the Commissioners for Enlargement, Trade, and Economic and Monetary Affairs respectively. EuropeAid does not deal with short-term humanitarian assistance, which is the task of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO).

Recommendations

In conclusion, the new instruments and institutional reforms are a sign of the political will of member states and the Commission to improve the EU’s potential for conflict prevention and crisis management. The new structure as a whole, however, does not simplify the already complicated institutional landscape of the EU system, in fact quite the contrary. The new institutional bodies of the second pillar are composed for the most part of national delegates who bring with them special bureaucratic interests from their national ministries. The controversial debate on ‘Mr CFSP’ several years ago, as well as the current definition of Mr Solana’s role, underlines the slow and difficult learning process of member states, who are all too eager to safeguard their sovereignty, in particular when it comes to security policy. After some quarrels about their respective areas of responsibility, the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for the CFSP have established a good working relationship. However, much energy has to be devoted to the task of coordination.

All in all, the EU has laid down an important foundation for fulfilling the third criterion. As for the necessary capabilities, initially the main political focus has been on the shortage of military instruments. The task of direct conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building, however, has also revealed tremendous shortfalls with regard to civilian instruments. As a result, the EU is currently focusing on developing civilian and military means of grappling with situations where violent conflict is either imminent, or has just ended, in order to be able to create a stable environment. As for the military means, governments will have difficulty in meeting the headline goals and at the same time
respecting the limit on budget deficit laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997. Consequently, the HG force will probably not become fully operational by 2003. At the same time the question has been raised whether the Petersberg tasks are overly restricted, bearing in mind the decisions taken by the European Council (21 September 2001) as regards European policy on combating terrorism. By contrast, civilian headline goals with regard to policing, the rule of law, administration and civil protection could be implemented on time because the costs are much lower. Additionally, however, the following steps should be undertaken:

- In order to meet the ECAP capability targets the EU should strive for more multilateral solutions. The ‘big three’ in particular should take the lead in more multilateral projects.
- Military expenditure should be channelled towards the most urgent military shortfalls.
- Military structures should be streamlined and reorganised in order to cope more adequately with post-modern, low-intensity conflicts.
- The fight against international terrorism should be included in the Petersberg tasks, and the military headline goals should be adapted to this new requirement (e.g. special forces and related equipment).
- Additional civilian crisis management capabilities should be developed such as pools of experts for democratisation, mediation, reconciliation, disarmament, demobilisation and freedom of the media.
- The problem of free-riding should be eased by the introduction of binding commitments based on some formulation of ‘convergence criteria’.
- The question of financing the operational costs of civilian crisis management should be resolved in generic terms. The general rule should be to cover all expenses related to start-up costs, travel, common costs and per diems by the CFSP budget. The states should cover the remaining costs.

European institutional reform is an ongoing but ever more difficult process, as the recent intergovernmental conferences of Amsterdam and Nice have shown. Whether the Convention will be successful in promoting radical reforms for the IGC in 2004 remains to be seen. The creation of new institutions is always the result of a political compromise between member states, who are usually unenthusiastic when it comes to sharing sovereignty, in
particular as far as security issues are concerned. Nevertheless, certain events have led to the creation of new or adapted institutions in the framework of ESDP, of which some parts are already learning from action while others are still in the process of reform. With the SG/HR (and the new format of the Troika) the external visibility of the EU has been enhanced, but without improving its efficiency. As European diplomacy remains limited for structural reasons, the position of the SG/HR has to be upgraded.

- A first step in this direction would be to institutionalise his role as chairman of the PSC.
- Furthermore, the question of the appropriateness of the current Troika has to be addressed. In view of the six-monthly rotation of the presidency, it would make more sense if the Troika, as a first step, were headed by the SG/HR. As a second step the role of external representation should be delegated to the SG/HR. This would allow the rotating Council presidency to focus on the chairing of the GAC or the future Foreign Affairs Council.
- The SG/HR should begin the right to take initiatives in foreign policy.
- The creation of the post of Deputy SG/HR should be considered, in order to accomplish different tasks relating to the post in an efficient way. This would include chairing the PSC while, in a crisis situation, conducting shuttle diplomacy.
- At the IGC in 2004, the EU should reverse its decision to create a separate structure for CFSP, which is sidelining the Commission, and merge the functions of the External Relations Commissioner with those of the SG/HR. This would bring the main branches of the EU’s foreign policy together. The SG/HR would then have both the authority and the means coterminous with the EU’s ambitions in the sphere of external relations.
- Compared with this proposal, it seems almost modest to request a considerable increase in the staffing of the PPEWU and the Directorate-General. This is a prerequisite for the functions of early warning, planning and analysis, but it means that the CFSP budget has to be increased.
- A unit for intelligence and counter-terrorism should be created within the PPEWU to act as a focal point for information provided by member states. It should keep in close touch with the EUMS’s intelligence branch and with the Europol anti-terrorist task force that was created after 11 September.

128. According to the proposal of Andréani, Bertram and Grant, “the heads of government would appoint this individual, subject to the approval of the president of the Commission. He or she would report to the foreign and defence ministers, but would also attend Commission meetings as the commissioner for external relations. This double-hatting should allow the incumbent to make a good job of marshalling all the EU resources behind its diplomatic initiatives.” Andréani, Bertram and Grant, op. cit., p. 48.
Special consideration should be given to the use of personnel who specialise in civilian crisis management. The participation of more experts from the Commission should also be considered. Finally, the PPEWU’s future members should be European civil servants. The advantages of this include the fact that they would not represent an ‘alien’ element within the Council Secretariat, their allegiance would be more European than national and it would guarantee continuity.

The Commission is undergoing a reform process that is in part due to past events, including certain cases of mismanagement and inefficiency. As to the Commission’s role in external relations, it has started to consider improved inter- and intra-pillar relations, which has already resulted in the implementation of some reform. The Commission has produced many good ideas and blueprints in the field of conflict prevention, but neither structural nor acute prevention can be guaranteed merely through programmes for democracy and human rights. What is still lacking is an integrated strategy.

That will necessitate, firstly, detailed steps to be taken covering the whole range of conflict prevention and crisis management, which have to be prioritised according to a clear strategic direction. The Commission’s new crisis coordination centre should lead to greater synergy within the first pillar through a comprehensive policy based on mainstreaming conflict prevention.

Reform of the internal structures should aim at the establishment of an integrated external service involving all external relations DGs, all external relations departments and all delegations.

The Commission’s delegations in third countries and international organisations should be transformed into EU embassies which should be entrusted with following through CFSP actions.

The main task remains improvement of the coherence of the policies of all three pillars. A process of ‘cross-pillarisation’ has slowly begun, but further consideration should be given to the question of how the Commission could be more closely associated with defence-related issues. Of course, due to the reluctance of most member states European defence will remain primarily an intergovernmental matter for the time being. But given the possible implementation of the ‘double hatting’ proposal mentioned above, it would make sense to look for a greater level of synergy because then the EU would be able to use its unique advantage of having at its disposal the full range of means for dealing with crises.


To begin with, the Commission and the Council should implement the EP’s proposal to draw up a comprehensive common strategy on combating terrorism.\(^\text{131}\)

**Operational culture**

Returning to the new quality of the post-international system (as described in the first chapter) one effect of the bifurcation into a world of states and a world of sub-state actors in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management is the changing nature of the operational environment. As the character of conflict has changed, so have the operations that are intended to deal with them. Consequently, the relation within and between military forces, and the relation between the military and the civilian sphere, are altering as well. As to the former, I confine myself to mentioning only a few characteristics, which are in no way exhaustive.

The end of the mass armies of the industrialised age arrived in the 1990s. A new kind of armed forces is now emerging that has been dubbed ‘postmodern military’.\(^\text{132}\) This process is characterised by a trend towards smaller, more sophisticated, highly professional armed forces. Operations are increasingly combined and joint. While military multilateralism is not a new phenomenon, today’s multilateral crisis management (NATO uses the term peace support operations (PSO)), is characterised by the number of participating states, its normative base and its complexity. Finally, civil-military relations are changing in two ways. First, the military is becoming ‘civilianised’ through the integration of typically civil perceptions, tasks and attitudes in its performance. Second, because of the shifting nature of typical missions the relation between military and civil actors in conflict prevention and conflict management operations is also changing.\(^\text{133}\) As this last aspect is of great importance in qualifying the EU as a cooperative security provider I will further elaborate.

If we take the traditional security policy approach, there is a clear distinction between military forces with their instruments and civil actors in the field, such as the international and national non-governmental organisations (INGO/NGO), local governmental actors and commercial actors. The military is usually subordinated to the political. Traditional warfare has not normally included a common civilian-military approach: strategies, tactics,
missions, logistics and communications have not been coordinated with civilian actors. Today's conflict prevention and conflict management, however, have nothing in common with traditional warfare. The objectives are totally different because there is no enemy to attack\textsuperscript{134} and no territory to conquer, but rather a safe environment to be established and guaranteed, human beings to protect, an infrastructure to be fixed and a security sector to be restructured. Not all of these tasks are in themselves military, and this is one reason why civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is becoming a central element of peace operations. Another reason is the considerable scale of civilian involvement in complex emergencies, which for instance can include more than several hundred NGOs. Experience gained in the Balkans and elsewhere shows that CIMIC is a very important component of conflict prevention and the management of crises.\textsuperscript{135} 

There exist, however, some challenges to effective CIMIC. One of these challenges relates to the fact that there is no common understanding of what CIMIC is. The term formerly meant national support for NATO forces and the coordination of operations with civilian authorities. Today the spectrum of civil-military cooperation is much broader. It includes liaison with civilian organisations and authorities and their support, as well as the support of military units and military commanders. There are overlapping activities, which lead to a mingling with civilian humanitarian engagement that may jeopardise a whole mission. Therefore, NATO has built up a CIMIC Centre in Brussels, and has developed 'CIMIC 2000', which aims to back up NATO forces using civilian actors in the field. Specific tasks include, for example, information gathering and assessment of the civil situation; activities designed to increase acceptance of the armed forces, the establishment of liaison offices, and the support of civilian activities such as reconstruction. The NATO CIMIC structure comprises departments for public affairs, civil infrastructure, economy and trade, humanitarian assistance, and cultural affairs.\textsuperscript{136} For NATO, the main purpose of CIMIC is to support military operations. However, this may conflict with the principles of humanitarian agencies defined by the Geneva Convention and Protocols. Civilian actors, especially from NGOs, therefore view the institutionalisation of CIMIC in military structures with some suspicion. They fear military domination. And, more importantly,
they are concerned that their impartiality could be questioned, which could in turn represent a threat to their security as well as to their humanitarian mission.

Another problem lies in the different institutional cultures. First, the military is a hierarchical organisation that works on the principle of command, while the structure of NGOs is basically horizontal. The military is also a static bureaucracy while NGOs are much more flexible, plus the military is an organisation controlled by the state, while NGOs or commercial actors are fairly independent. It follows that armed forces can be seen as being consumed by the pursuit of national interests while civilian actors are much guided more by humanitarian causes. Finally, the objective of armed forces in crisis management is oriented towards the short-term, whereas NGOs often focus on long-term effects. Admittedly, this is a rather crude sketch of both military and civilian structures, but it highlights some important differences with regard to the institutional and operational cultures in the area of crisis prevention and management. 137

Given this background, it is hardly surprising that the perception each has of the other may be too simplistic. Even though this problem is becoming much better understood by each party, mainly as a result of shared experience in dealing with crises during the last decade, there are shortcomings on both sides that have to be tackled. As far as the civilian sector is concerned, the lack of regulation, a poor assessment of needs, duplication of effort and the quest for publicity in order to get new funds should be mentioned. On the military side there is a tendency to control and direct all activities while disregarding the different approach of NGOs. Furthermore, soldiers have an understandable desire to help the local population in the context of an immediate violent crisis without being trained to deal with civilian needs. There is also a desire by governments to promote a positive image of their armed forces engaged in peacekeeping, and they therefore sometimes follow a political agenda that is different from the official humanitarian cause. 138

Notwithstanding the different operational cultures and perceptions, the need for civil-military cooperation is unquestionable. Much progress has been made towards the institutionalisation of CIMIC. Civilian agencies and NGOs are fully aware of the fact that their job can only be done if the environment is made safe

by external military and police forces. International coordination and agency collaboration have increased, and so has the professionalism of NGOs. The added value of CIMIC for NGOs lies first of all in logistical assistance, and in return they are able to give advice on procedures and standards regarding relief work. The politico-military side also has advantages in devising CIMIC frameworks and institutionalising civil-military cooperation, but civilian actors should be consulted at an early stage. Finally, intensive information exchange is indispensable in order for the various actors to function coherently, although this issue is extremely sensitive.

From 2001, CIMIC was considered within the framework of ESDP in 2001. The WEU Concept on CIMIC, adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers on 23 November 1999, serves as an appropriate preliminary basis. The third revision of this detailed concept was presented to a Council meeting on 15 May 2001.139 CIMIC has, however, neither been a topic in recent ESDP documents nor mentioned in the relatively detailed exercise programme of the Presidency Report on the ESDP of the Göteborg European Council. The latter does, however, contain provisions on specific EU exercises concerning civil crisis management and the combined use of civilian and military instruments. In this context it is also stated that ‘EU exercises should as appropriate be open for participation and observation by other international organisations and appropriate NGOs.’140 The subsequent Belgian presidency presented a catalogue of questions concerning CIMIC that has been forwarded to the MC and the CIVCOM.

The EU has to tackle CIMIC at two different levels. First and foremost CIMIC has to deal with intra-pillar relations (civil-civil coordination), with the question of coherence between military and civil instruments (civil-military coordination) and between military instruments and forces belonging to member states acting within the EU framework (military-military coordination). I would describe these relationships as internal CIMIC. The four priorities defined for civilian aspects of crisis prevention and management – civilian police, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection – will first have to be integrated in a comprehensive civil-military EU approach. Then, the same will apply for national military instruments. Hence the EU’s approach to CIMIC is much broader than the traditional NATO one. There has to be overall

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coordination, necessitating intensive collaboration between the Council, the Commission and member states. With the creation of the PSC and several interfaces, especially between the first and the second pillars, important institutional preconditions have been established. However, a detailed explanation of what the internal EU CIMIC will be and how it can be implemented has yet to be given. According to an expert from the Policy Unit, clarification is necessary, for instance, concerning the role of the CIVCOM, the Coordinating Mechanism and the crisis management procedures.\textsuperscript{141} This could be done through exercises, once the procedures and arrangements have been properly developed. Moreover, the establishment of a CIMIC mechanism for the preparation and implementation of policy options should be considered.\textsuperscript{142}

The second level of CIMIC relates to relations between EU military-civilian activities and external civil actors. A broad, two-level concept of CIMIC has to be elaborated\textsuperscript{143} that takes into account the inherent problems of civil-military cooperation as well as the special requirements with regard to the primacy of the civilian approach. As to the latter, this means that, in contrast to NATO’s approach, the military cannot be the hub of the external CIMIC structure unless the situation on the ground makes enforcement measures necessary.\textsuperscript{144} However, in this case the possibility of external civil-military cooperation is rather problematic because humanitarian organisations are required to remain impartial. It will be difficult enough to convince warring parties that ECHO – although it is part of the EU – is a purely humanitarian organisation and not a party to the conflict. As a consequence, it is not feasible to envisage the model of an integrated external CIMIC approach turning military Combined Joint Task Forces into Combined Integrated Joint Task Forces, with NGOs on board.\textsuperscript{145}

One can assume that the smaller the security threat, the less controversial external civil-military cooperation will be. Nevertheless, there will be a strong need for coordination. One option is the ‘lead agency’ concept envisaged by the UNHCR.\textsuperscript{146} This concept, however, has the disadvantage that it functions on the basis of consensus, thus implying that every actor can block the coordination efforts. The other option is a lead agency with command authority, as exercised by the UNHCR between 1994 and 1996 in Rwanda. However, in these examples the aim was to coordinate the work of humanitarian organisations among themselves.\textsuperscript{147} The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{141} Interview in Brussels on 22 October 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{142} It should be recalled that the coordinating mechanism foreseen at Helsinki only concerns civilian crisis management tools.
\item \textsuperscript{143} I confine myself to some general remarks and a few proposals.
\item \textsuperscript{144} A good base for the necessary search for a new concept of CIMIC is the so-called ‘Oslo Guidelines’ from 1994 and the UNHCR’s ‘ladders of options’ concept.
\item \textsuperscript{145} The WEU concept also considers the possibility of military command over all agencies as a desirable approach, representing probably the most difficult (if not impossible) challenge due to the complexity of PKOs. It also considers the necessity for continuous political-military interaction with a large number of other actors. See WEU, CM (99) 3rd revision, Annex P.
\item \textsuperscript{146} See Christopher Bellamy, ‘Combining Combat Readiness and Compassion’, NATO Review, Summer 2001, pp. 9-11.
\item \textsuperscript{147} See Ted A. van Baarda, ‘Better Coordination Through Institutional Reform and Consensus Coordination in the Field’, in Peter Viggo Jakobsen (ed.), op. cit., pp. 95 ff.
\end{itemize}
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), founded in 1998, could serve as a blueprint for coordination including military assets. It is conceivable that the military could be part of a similar system headed at the strategic level by the PSC, with the EUMC and CIVCOM providing military and civilian advice. It is exactly this combination of civilian leadership and military advice which is the ‘prerequisite for improving civil-military relations in peacekeeping operations’. At the operational level, an EU High Representative with a mandate for CIMIC in a crisis, supported by adequate staff, would give political guidance to military commanders. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) would have to be developed which should include information on the role, function and structure of coordination mechanisms. Furthermore, CIMIC centres and points of contact should be set up in order to establish direct and effective communication between all actors. A special office for NGOs could promote closer relations.

Whatever external CIMIC structures are developed by the EU, ‘areas of cooperation should be narrowly defined, in order to avoid the militarisation of humanitarian aid.’ This would be the case if humanitarian assistance were under the control of the military. That is why it is of the utmost importance that a clear distinction be made between respective areas of responsibility. The evolving EU concept of CIMIC must be developed with the early participation of humanitarian agencies and NGOs, because their input may be crucial to the smooth functioning of any future CIMIC system. Leading humanitarian agencies and NGOs should also be involved in joint planning and exercises at an early stage. In this context, the Commission could fall back on its largely developed network of contacts with NGOs.

It is clear that the primary task currently being undertaken is aimed at ensuring civil-military coordination within the EU. The Spanish presidency was mandated to work out the practical details. As to internal CIMIC, the EU carried out its first exercise of crisis management (CME 02) at the end of May 2002. Regarding external CIMIC, the MC adopted two papers in Spring 2002. One is a military concept called ‘CIMIC concept for EU led crisis management operations’, the other ‘CIMIC functional planning guide’, which deals with strategic-operational questions. The PSC has noted both papers. Now it is CIVCOM’s task to pro...
vide civilian input. The result of this process will be a comprehensive EU CIMIC concept that may be approved by the Council in the near future.

Recommendations

The difficulties as well as the significance of CIMIC have been acknowledged, however, given its early state of development, no evaluation is feasible yet. Nevertheless, there is a discernible attempt to address the challenge of CIMIC, and there is therefore hope that the fourth criterion will be met soon. Several important general aspects, however, should be considered:

- The EU has to develop a comprehensive approach to CIMIC at two levels. The first level relates to the internal dimension of CIMIC between the different institutional and operational actors and the internal structures, procedures and modalities. The second level concerns CIMIC established with external partners such as IGOs and NGOs.
- As to internal CIMIC, the role of the CIVCOM and the Coordinating Mechanism should be clarified and - together with crisis management procedures - tested through exercises. A special CIMIC mechanism for the preparation and implementation of policy options should be established.
- The complexity of post-international conflict and the necessity to deal with a variety of civil actors in the conflict zone makes the creation of an EU concept for external CIMIC necessary. Cooperation between military and civilian actors should ensure added value for all participants.
- As to external CIMIC, military and civilian actors have a different operational culture, which should be known and accepted by both.
- There should be neither an integrated CIMIC approach subordinating civilian actors to military command nor informal domination by the military.
- A clear distinction should be made between respective areas of responsibility.
- Civilian actors should be consulted at a very early stage when it comes to institutionalising CIMIC.
- As no CIMIC operation can be effective without the participation of military reserve personnel, the role of these civilian specialists

154. The Danish Presidency has declared that it attaches importance to ensuring a balance between the EU’s military and civilian resources. It aims at clarifying “how the various civilian capabilities might best work together in crisis situations. The idea is that in a crisis situation the EU should be able to offer a package which is tailor-made to the task in hand”. Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, One Europe, Programme of the Danish Presidency of the EU, www.eu2002.dk, p. 27.
with their unique skills for CIMIC tasks in the field should be considered and integrated in an EU-wide policy on reserves.\textsuperscript{155} 
\begin{itemize}
  \item There should be joint planning and joint exercises with major civilian actors, including NGOs.
\end{itemize}

### Cooperation with OSCE/UN

International organisations have become increasingly important actors in today’s conflict prevention and crisis management after the demise of superpower rivalry. This development is also a result of increased international and transnational interaction. Dealing with world turbulence obviously necessitates international coordination mechanisms and organisations.\textsuperscript{156} Against this background the OSCE and the UN have a special role to play. First, they are collective security organisations that can provide their members with a mandate for international action. Second, they are hybrid security organisations that follow a comprehensive security approach. Third, they can provide added value through their special expertise in dealing with conflict prevention and crisis management, especially if crisis prevention and post-conflict peace building are required. As the EU represents a community of values and law, it should develop strong ties with both organisations.\textsuperscript{157} In this respect, I will focus in this section on the relationships between the EU and both the OSCE and UN, which is the fifth criterion for the EU becoming a cooperative security provider, as defined in the first chapter.

As far as the relation between the EU and the OSCE is concerned, it has been critically asked whether the evolving ESDP is designed to support or to sideline the OSCE.\textsuperscript{158} The OSCE’s 1999 Charter for European Security defined its role as a ‘regional arrangement’ under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and as such is defined as ‘a primary organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes within its region and as a key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation’.\textsuperscript{159} At the same time, the OSCE is the embodiment of the commonly recognised norms of European ordre public as agreed in the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter and the Helsinki Document of 1992.

Even before the CFSP was conceived, the CSCE/OSCE offered a promising framework for concerted EU action, and that is still
the case today. Moreover, there have been many concerted actions at the strategic level – the stability pacts for Europe and for South Eastern Europe to mention just two – and at the operational level, such as the monitoring of elections or cooperation between ECMM and OSCE observers in the Balkans. On the other hand, the EU is creating ‘soft’ security instruments that seem to duplicate OSCE efforts. These relate, for instance, to measures that were decided at the OSCE’s 1999 Istanbul summit, such as the creation of Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT), the development of the ability to carry out police-related activities in order to assist in maintaining the rule of law, or the establishment of operation centres. As the EU already plays a decisive role in shaping European security using non-military means, the new instruments are both complementary and, depending on the political situation, exclusive. In any event, in Istanbul, at the initiative of some EU members, the OSCE participating states adopted a Platform for Cooperative Security whose goal is ‘to strengthen the mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between those organizations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area’.

There is indeed a stronger relationship between CFSP and the OSCE than between other international organisations. The weekly meetings of the Permanent Council are commonly prepared by permanent representatives of the Fifteen in Vienna, at sessions chaired by the EU presidency. Furthermore, there is an OSCE working group in the Council Secretariat and the member state holding the EU presidency usually submits a common position to the Permanent Council with which the future member countries are often associated. The President of the Commission and the External Relations Commissioner participate in summits and ministerial councils of the OSCE. EU members contribute two-thirds of the OSCE budget and the EU gives considerable support to the field activities of the OSCE through the EU budget.

Against this background the EU is a crucial – if not the most important – actor for the OSCE. It goes without saying, however, that it is sometimes difficult to reach agreement among the Fifteen. Should a member state disagree with the common position, it is entitled to present its own position. Inter-pillar rivalry can be a reason for such disagreement. For instance, during the last German presidency the Commission claimed the right to speak for the Economic Forum, causing some discontent on the German

side. Nevertheless, the OSCE is in theory and practice an important organisation when it comes to conflict prevention and crisis management within the geographic area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It is the only all-European organisation in which the United States and Russia cooperate on an equal basis, having a special potential, ‘which will become all the more important, the more countries join the European Union’.  

The OSCE is therefore regarded by the EU as an international lead organisation that could benefit from the ESDP project. On the military side, the added value can be seen in the context of missions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, for example in the provision of peacekeeping contingents for trouble spots like Nagorno-Karabakh. On the civilian side, the new capabilities are expressly designed ‘to meet the requests of other lead organisations: they would be able to count – on a more systematic basis – on a sizeable quantitative and qualitative contribution, which would represent the nucleus of some of their missions.’ According to the Göteborg Presidency Report on ESDP, the OSCE is ‘a key partner for the EU in civilian crisis management. The REACT system, training standards and OSCE procedures for rapid reaction are particularly important for the developing EU capacity in this field.’ Since the Commission has an important role to play in this area, it maintains a permanent dialogue with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and with the OSCE Secretariat. It participates in joint programmes and projects, and has started detailed discussions with the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre concerning information exchange, the REACT system and training standards. The OSCE is also seen as a broader multilateral platform for combating terrorism. Accordingly, the Commission and the Presidency participated in the OSCE meeting of 4 December 2001, during which a broad Action Plan on counter-terrorism measures was adopted.

As far as the EU’s relationship with the UN is concerned, links have only recently been intensified regarding conflict prevention and crisis management projects. The EC has had a delegation to the UN since 1974, and it has observer status at the UN General Assembly and at most of the UN’s specialised agencies. Furthermore, the EC is party to over 50 UN multilateral agreements and conventions as the only non-state participant. The UN, as the world body with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, is increasingly seen as a key part-
ner in conflict prevention and crisis management. The EU has a genuine interest in backing the UN’s critical role in the framework for multilateralism and international order, and the EU ‘recognises its responsibility to support and strengthen the UN in order to protect the organisation’s role in seeking multilateral solutions to global problems on the basis of its charter’.

The pressure that the EU can bring to bear within the UN is not negligible. France and the UK are permanent members of the Security Council, and EU member states contribute approximately 37 per cent of the UN budget, 40 per cent of the cost of UN peacekeeping operations and 50 per cent of all member states’ contributions to UN programmes and funds.

The peacebuilding approach outlined in the UNSG’s ‘Brahimi Report’, is one to which the EU fully subscribes and inspired the Commission’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism. There has also been some division of labour in recent operations in Kosovo and East Timor. The same is true for the Union’s actions in Afghanistan. For example, it encouraged the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF), which was mandated by UNSC Resolution 1386. The EU is cooperating closely with the UNSC’s Committee on Counter-Terrorism, and it is the biggest donor of humanitarian aid for Afghanistan, which is distributed inter alia by the UNHCR, the WFP and the ICRC. The EU has appointed a special representative for Afghanistan under the authority of the SG/HR, who has close working relations with the UN special representative in order to coordinate international rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.

Both organisations have agreed to work together on the basis of complementarity and have, in this respect, started regular discussions on cooperation in peacebuilding operations. A concrete example is the EU’s promotion within the UN of the elaboration of an interim legal framework based on public international law for actors participating in crisis management missions in failed states. Further steps towards closer cooperation include the EC/UN framework agreement of 1999, the EU’s plan to support the Trust Fund for Preventative Action and its offer to exchange its Country Strategy Papers with the UN Common Country Assessment. The Commission has already entered into a structured dialogue with other UN agencies, and is seeking to establish further contacts with further UN agencies, funds and programmes.

170. See European Council, Laeken, Presidency Conclusions, Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, SN 300/01, pp. 4 f.
The Göteborg European Council confirmed that the EU-UN partnership would be further strengthened by mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention and by ensuring that the EU’s evolving military and civilian capacities could provide real added value for UN crisis management. The Council designated the Western Balkans, the Middle East and Africa as the highest priority regions for this reinforced cooperation. Finally, the Council Conclusions on EU-UN Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management were adopted outlining three themes, as well as different areas of cooperation:

- Conflict prevention: exchange of information and analysis concerning ongoing crises; cooperation on fact-finding; coordination of diplomatic activity and messages, including consultation between special representatives; field coordination and training; increased coordination in electoral assistance and election monitoring.
- Civilian and military aspects of crisis management: enhanced compatibility of training standards for civilian crisis management personnel; exchange of information on questions related to the planning and implementation of crisis management; coordination in the field.
- Particular regional issues as mentioned above.

These conclusions also mention future arrangements for intensified cooperation, which is to take place on four levels:

- EU ministerial meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UNSG.
- Meetings between the SG/HR and the External Relations Commissioner with the UNSG and his deputy.
- Meetings between the PSC and the UNSG and his deputy.
- Contacts between the Council Secretariat and the Commission services and the UN Secretariat at the appropriate level.

The EU has a number of reasons for intensifying cooperation with the UN, as already suggested above. First, the world body has primary responsibility when it comes to peace enforcement. The use of force is legitimate only under two conditions: either the UNSC decides so, or in the case of self-defence. Second, the UN has a lot of field experience in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. Third, it follows a comprehensive security approach similar to that of the EU. Fourth, cooperation offers the possibi-
ity of task sharing and promoting synergy, thus reducing costs and increasing efficiency. Fifth, both organisations are promoting regional and subregional integration as a path to peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

Finally, the profile of ESDP would be enhanced and so would the EU’s identity as a cooperative security provider. The comprehensive approach of the ESDP can be understood as the EU’s response to the Brahimi Report, which represents a detailed and thorough examination of the requirements of peace operations in the twenty-first century. The Report has been widely cited in recent statements, and the Union is generally prepared to offer all its new capacities, arising from the framework of ESDP, to the UN. The latter is strongly dependent on support from regional organisations in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. Once civilian and military goals have been implemented, the EU could become the most important regional partner of the UN with regard to acute prevention. At the same time, it could emerge as an example for other regional integration processes. As the EU is not a military alliance but a regional organisation sui generis which will one day comprise over thirty states, unilateral and unauthorised military operations like NATO’s action in Kosovo will be unlikely.\(^{178}\)

However, the main difficulties of both lead organisations, OSCE and UN, are threefold: lack of resources, lack of compliance by members and their lack of homogeneity. In contrast, the EU and its member states have a variety of resources at their disposal, including those being created for the ESDP. The EU is also a comparatively cohesive regional community. Actions by EU member states relating to conflict prevention and crisis management within the framework of other international organisations have to be coordinated to the extent that a common position is reached, as laid down in Art. 19 TEU. Although member states do not always comply with this provision, there is an increasing awareness that Europe will only be able to have a say in world affairs if it speaks with one voice. That is why they have decided to develop a crisis management capability and to intensify cooperation with international organisations. This cooperation refers, in particular, to the OSCE and the UN, guided by the principles of added value, interoperability, visibility and decision-making autonomy.\(^{179}\)

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Recommendations

To sum up this section, one can conclude that the EU is taking a strong cooperative approach towards the leading international organisations, not only in political rhetoric but also in concrete actions, even though these actions have to be intensified considerably in order to build up and sustain mutually reinforcing, and above all effective, partnerships. While the EPC/CFSP approach towards the OSCE can build on a long record, cooperation with the UN can clearly be improved. The reasons for closer cooperation with both organisations are compelling. The EU is in itself an expression of advanced multilateralism that has led to the development of federal structures. It is well placed in both organisations to exert significant influence and shape the world order if it speaks with one voice. It is in the EU’s own interest to back international multilateralism in general, and these two leading organisations in particular, and to refrain from the temptation succumbed to by the United States of cherry-picking the good things and leaving most of the rest. Cooperation on conflict prevention and crisis management should be strengthened in both civilian and military fields. The following aspects should be considered in particular:

- The EU should offer stand-by agreements to the OSCE and the UN, covering the whole range of its prevention and crisis management capabilities.

- Joint training and exercise programmes should be developed.

- Common standards for cooperating in conflict prevention and crisis management should be defined.

- There has to be enhanced information exchange at all levels.

- The appointment of a special EU representative to New York for CFSP/ESDP matters should be considered, as well as the creation of a hotline between the EU’s pol-mil structures and the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations.

- Joint analysis and mission planning should be envisaged.

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180. See the plea for multilateralism in international institutions by Chris Patten, "Alle Anständigen in den Kampf einbeziehen", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 September 2001, p. 16.

181. President Chirac has announced a French proposal concerning European contributions to UN peace operations for discussion among the Fifteen. See ‘Discours du Président de la République, M. Jacques Chirac, à l’Occasion de la Réception des Ambassadeurs’, Paris, 27 August 2001, p. 3.
In this paper the principal question has been what guiding model (Leitbild) the EU should adopt with regard to CFSP/ESDP. A public discussion on this question is indispensable because of the increasing indifference shown by Europeans towards the EU and the security challenges that it has been facing since the end of the East-West conflict in general, and following the dramatic events of 11 September 2001 in particular.

In the first chapter I have sought to present the political relevance of models as both abstract descriptions of reality and prescriptive formulas of policy objectives that represent basic values, norms and interests, thus contributing to the forming of an external EU identity. One of the findings is that none of the three models– the EU as a civilian, a military or a normative power – which have been constructed since the 1970s in different historical environments is adequate given the changing international background, characterised by the various facets of globalisation. I have therefore proposed that the EU’s external activities should be based on a ‘cooperative security provider’ model, embracing civilian, military and normative characteristics in a comprehensive approach to peace and security. This approach starts from the premise that traditional defence and security policy, with its relatively clear definitions of interstate-oriented interests and threats, does not address the new security dilemma in an adequate way. A different kind of strategic thinking is necessary to cope with the tremendous complexity of post-international violent conflicts. As these conflicts undermine international order and regional stability as well as threatening the values, norms and lives of citizens, the EU and its member states must be actively engaged in a variety of ways and with a large range of instruments. Against this background, five basic ideas – normative-focus, appropriateness, inclusiveness, multi-level orientation and multilateralism – are relevant for a cooperative security provider. These have been presented and translated in the paper into maxims of action.
Any model for the EU's foreign policy has to be underpinned by appropriate institutions if it is to be valid. For this purpose, the institution, i.e. the EU, has to perform several functions. It must contribute to the formation of a distinct context of action, to which is attributed a clear rationale leading to some kind of standardisation of perceptions and assessments as well as contributing to effective action. If we look at the five criteria, a preliminary conclusion is that the EU is well on the road to becoming a cooperative security provider. With the recent developments in CFSP/ESDP and the comprehensive approach to security, it has defined a distinct context of action that is now in the process of refinement. The prevailing rationale is without doubt cooperative, and prevention-oriented, notwithstanding many shortcomings. The standardisation of perceptions and assessments is a long-term task that will improve only gradually with ongoing cooperation within the new ESDP structures.

As to effectiveness of operations, there is a lot to criticise, which eventually boils down to both the divisions among member states and the problem of EU coherence. The recent reforms regarding the EU's foreign policy apparatus notwithstanding, the remaining divisions among the EU institutions remain a severe impediment to the EU becoming an effective international actor. The EU must therefore ensure that its various policies are to be linked to its foreign policy objectives.

In 1998 a German diplomat described the CFSP as 'Much diplomacy, quite respectable amounts of money, but no soldiers'. Since then a lot has happened. The same diplomat also made it clear that a realistic evaluation of the CFSP was not feasible, we used the United States as a benchmark, but only if we took as a point of comparison what the situation would be with every country acting on its own and the non-existence of the CFSP. From this perspective the CFSP can only be evaluated in a positive way. EU members act together where they see the need to take common decisions and actions; when this is not the case they pursue a national approach. In other words, they are still performing what was called 'assembled foreign policy' twenty years ago, i.e. trying to benefit from EC, CFSP and national resources. Chris Patten himself has rightly said that foreign policy 'cannot be confined to one pillar of the Treaty', but must integrate national policies, community policies, and CFSP itself.

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Antonio Missiroli is right to conclude that 'the EU has not yet completed its transition from a purely and genuinely “civilian power” . . . to a fully-fledged international actor in its own right that aims to project security beyond its borders. The completion of such transition is still open-ended and hardly a foregone conclusion: the ‘S’ of European security policies at a critical juncture along the way. The decisive questions remain: what kind of ‘S’ do we really need? This it worth debating during the Convention on the Future of Europe particularly, as the head of the Convention has put it, when ‘today’s world lacks a strong, united and peaceful Europe’.

Could the hyper-terrorism of 11 September 2001 turn out as a new menace fédératrice that could change EU member states’ security priorities? The first reactions of the big EU countries have caused some criticism with regard to their inclination to enter a national ‘beauty contest’ instead of accepting the proposal of the Belgian presidency to pool European resources. This reaction showed clearly that CFSP is still in its infancy, and that the European dilemma – how to conserve national sovereignty while there is an urgent need for more cooperation and integration in the field of security – remains unresolved.

Meanwhile, however, there is a clear trend towards intensified cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. In the face of the threat of hyper-terrorism, the notion of ‘homeland defence’ is becoming topical again, yet in a completely changed international context and with a new meaning. The borders between external and internal security are becoming blurred, necessitating a new trade-off between projection and protection.

As to the projection of stability, the European Council stated at its extraordinary session after 11 September that ‘[i]t is by developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and by making the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operational at the earliest opportunity that the Union will bemost effective.’ But this will not be sufficient. The role of ESDP in combating terrorism has to be discussed. What kind of adjustments related to forsestructures, doctrine and equipment are necessary? Are member states ready to bear the costs of the necessary innovations? How can national intelligence capabilities be pooled? How can the synergies of the three pillars be furthered in the fight against terrorism?
The European Council has adopted an action plan to combat terrorism by enhancing inter alia police and judicial cooperation, developing international legal instruments and strengthening transport security. Other important steps have been taken, such as greater anti-terrorist cooperation among member states and the creation of a task force on anti-terrorism within Europol. The European Council has also underlined that ‘the integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development is the condition for a strong and sustainable community for combating terrorism.’

In other words, the EU is also pleading for ‘structural prevention’, but what will that mean in practical terms? Are the EU and its members willing to invest the resources necessary for a long-term commitment, the outcome of which is uncertain? In the face of an increasing privatization of violence – be it in the form of warlordism, international crime or transnational terrorism – how can security be organized in our highly vulnerable and complex industrial societies?

The EU’s reaction to 11 September displays a post-modern understanding of security that was again emphasized by Chris Patten when he criticized the ‘dangerous instinct’ of the United States, ‘that the projection of military power is the only basis of true security.’ Patten alternatively emphasized the notion of security as a wider concept that necessitated doing ‘all we can to bolster weak or failing states and prevent them falling into the clutches of the bin Ladens of the world’. Today’s intrastate and transnational conflicts cannot be solved by way of simplistic policy. That is not to say that military means have no role to play in the fight against terrorism. However, as the related problems are of a complex, social nature, the response has to be differentiated in accordance with precepts of international security governance.

In the Laeken Declaration, heads of state and government stressed that ‘Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalization’. They also raised the question of ‘how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and model in the new, multipolar world?’ Some suggested answers to this question have been outlined in this paper. The development of certain capabilities and their inclusion in a comprehensive conflict prevention and crisis management strategy is essential to ensure
international stability and security in the age of globalisation. Therefore the EU and its member states should intensify efforts already made to follow a comprehensive security approach that integrates civilian and military instruments in a CFSP characterised by cooperation and prevention. It is exactly this task of integrating policies and means in a normative political project that will finally determine whether the model of the EU as a cooperative security provider is accepted, in turn creating a distinctive European security identity.
Abbreviations

ACP  Africa(n), Caribbean and Pacific
C3I  Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC  Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVCOM  Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CIVPOL  Civil Police
COPS  Comité de politique et de sécurité (see PSC below)
COREPER  Permanent Representatives Committee
CSCE  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DG  Directorate-General
EC  European Communities
ECAP  European Capability Action Plan
ECHO  European Community Humanitarian Office
ECMM  European Community Monitoring Mission (in former Yugoslavia)
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union
EP  European Parliament
EPC  European Political Cooperation
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy
EU  European Union
EUMC  European Union Military Committee
EUMS  European Union Military Staff
EUPM  European Union Police Mission
Europol  European Police Office
G-8  Group of Eight leading industrialised nations
GAC  General Affairs Council
HG  Headline Goals
HQ  Headquarters
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
ICC  International Criminal Court
IGC  Intergovernmental Conference
IGO  Intergovernmental Organisation
INGO  International NGO
IPTF  International Police Task Force
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PPEWU  Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee (COPS in French)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPEWU</td>
<td>Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REACT</td>
<td>Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>RELEX</td>
<td>External Relations Directorate General</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRM</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG/HR</td>
<td>Secretary-General and High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITCEN</td>
<td>Situation Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCRs</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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The principal question of this Chaillot Paper is what guiding model (Leitbild) the EU should adopt with regard to CFSP. Facing the challenges of the post-post-Cold War era, the traditional models - the EU as a civilian, a military or a normative power - no longer seem appropriated. This paper suggests that the EU's external activities should be based on a 'cooperative security provider' model, embracing civilian, military and normative elements in a comprehensive approach to peace and security.

With the development of ESDP as part of CFSP and its comprehensive approach to security, the EU has defined its own specific framework for external action that is now in the process of refinement. The prevailing rationale of CFSP is without doubt cooperative and prevention-oriented but many shortfalls persist. Harmonisation of perceptions and common assessments in particular are indispensable, but will only be achieved step by step through ongoing cooperation within the new structures. As to the effectiveness of operations, lack of coherence is still the most important weakness of CFSP. Divergences between member states and the complexity of decision-making structures both remain major obstacles to be overcome if the EU is to become a serious international actor.

To contribute effectively to international stability and security in the age of globalisation, the EU needs to develop its various policies on the basis of a commonly agreed global vision. The Union and its member states should therefore enhance their efforts to follow a comprehensive security approach that combines civilian and military instruments, and focuses on cooperation and prevention. Only if the EU manages to integrate its policies and its means into a common project based on internationally accepted norms and values will the cooperative security provider model be able to create a distinctive European security identity.